tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post7574908316033085577..comments2022-03-25T07:20:12.468-04:00Comments on Matters of Substance: Bennett on The Ideological Price of "Low" Ontologies (Part I: Constitution)Gabriele Contessahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-58336781387913016002009-08-10T09:03:22.034-04:002009-08-10T09:03:22.034-04:00Hi Jason,
First, I think it makes a big differenc...Hi Jason,<br /><br /><i>First, I think it makes a big difference whether we have Lewis-the-modal-realist or some other non-modal-realist-like counterpart theorist in mind. For, suppose I start the day with no views on modal realism whatsoever. I start thinking about statues and lumps, and then decide I need something counterpart-theoretic-like to solve my problems. If I decide to go full-blown modal realist just to take care of this, then I've gone high *ontology* in a pretty straightforward sense (although not one in which I've multiplied number of things in the statue-shaped region). But if I do something else, then I may have to go high ideology instead</i><br /><br />I'm not sure the ersatz modal realist needs more ideology than the extreme modal realist (and partly because, to me, it is far from clear what 'ideology' covers). In any case, Bennett seems to be talking about Lewis not about some other modal realist and seems to be assuming that he occupies the low ontology side of the dispute (presumably because what she means by 'low ontologists' in this context are just the one-thingers). Moreover, Lewis clearly did not decide to go full-blown modal realist to solve material constitution puzzles. If one were to identify his single most important reason for going modal realist I guess it would be to provide an analyisis of modality and what I think Lewis would have said is that the material constitution puzzles are solved for free once one accepts his (modal realism + counterpart theory + perdurantism) package because they are puzzles about identity through time and/or possible worlds.<br /><br /><i>it's not at all obvious that I can simply help myself to some sort of similarity relation and go all context-dependent on that, since I don't have the needed possibilia to serve as relata for it. So I will need some sort of extra ideology to tell me which ersatz individuals *count* as counterparts (or similar, or whatever).</i><br /><br />To me it's not at all obvious that the ersatzer can<i>not</i> help herself to some sort of similarity relation and go all context-dependent on that. If she can't, she was already losing to the extreme modal realist on the modality ground and you are right the debate gets pushed back. But Bennett is not considering the debate between two kinds of modal realist but between the Lewis-style one-thinger and her multi-thinger opponent.<br /><br /><i>Also, I think it's important for Bennett's points that we're not considering an already committed theorist -- say who buys modal realism + counterpart theory -- and ask them if they get any extra commitments by adopting a certain solution to a puzzle. The question is how their commitments, both ideological and ontological, compare to some *other* theorist's who adopts a different response to a question.</i> <br /><br />I think that metaphysical position are assessed on the basis of their simplicity <i>and</i> explanatory power, so you can't judge the simplicity of a theory without assessing how many other problems it helps you solve, or at least this is what Lewis would have claimed. As far as I can see, no one would go modal realist (whether full-blown or not) just to solve material constitution puzzles. It is only if those who are already modal realists that will try to use their theory to solve them.Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-43362368005829890812009-08-08T05:22:19.623-04:002009-08-08T05:22:19.623-04:00A handful of thoughts here:
First, I think it mak...A handful of thoughts here:<br /><br />First, I think it makes a big difference whether we have Lewis-the-modal-realist or some other non-modal-realist-like counterpart theorist in mind. For, suppose I start the day with no views on modal realism whatsoever. I start thinking about statues and lumps, and then decide I need something counterpart-theoretic-like to solve my problems. If I decide to go full-blown modal realist just to take care of this, then I've gone high *ontology* in a pretty straightforward sense (although not one in which I've multiplied number of things in the statue-shaped region). But if I do something else, then I may have to go high ideology instead; it's not at all obvious that I can simply help myself to some sort of similarity relation and go all context-dependent on that, since I don't have the needed possibilia to serve as relata for it. So I will need some sort of extra ideology to tell me which ersatz individuals *count* as counterparts (or similar, or whatever). (We'll also lose the ability to analyze modal operators, so we'll need modal ideology to make up for it, too.) In other words: it looks to me that, at this point in the dialectic, the ideology/ontology point just gets *pushed back*, in this case to whether we have a high ontology or high ideology counterpart theory. <br /><br />Also, I think it's important for Bennett's points that we're not considering an already committed theorist -- say who buys modal realism + counterpart theory -- and ask them if they get any extra commitments by adopting a certain solution to a puzzle. The question is how their commitments, both ideological and ontological, compare to some *other* theorist's who adopts a different response to a question. In this case, it does look as though (say) the non-Lewisian counterpart theorist has a higher ideology than the non-Lewisian two-thinger; the non-Lewisian two-thinger needs just primitive modal operators, but the non-Lewisian one-thinger needs either (1) multiple primitive modal operators corresponding to different counterpart relations, or (2, and more likely) other ideological resources to "define up" something that works like (1). <br /><br />(Notice that the Lewisian two-thinger and the Lewisian one-thinger are metaphysically equivalent: the Lewisian one-thinger, who rejects counterpart theory, is (presumably) just Lewis with modal overlap, where individuals are identified with transworld sums and coincidence is interpreted as overlap-at-a-world.)Jasonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08511374467709845882noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-18183501371675435862009-08-08T00:35:14.657-04:002009-08-08T00:35:14.657-04:00Hi Jeff,
Let me put my point differently, as I ta...Hi Jeff,<br /><br />Let me put my point differently, as I take Bennett's point to be about predicates (ideology) not about properties (ontology).As Bennett clearly says at the beginning of the passage I quoted that her point is about how, on the Lewisian strategy, the predicate 'being possibly squashed'would "[hide] a multiplicity of more complex predicates". My point was that there is no extra ideological bill for the Lewisian to foot. The Lewisian does not need that multiplicity of complex predicates because what he is claiming is not that there are a multiplicity of predicates Lump/Statue satisfies in all contexts, but that there is one predicate--'being possibly squashed'--that Statue/Lump can be said to satisfy in some conversational contexts but not in others because of the different counterpart relations made relevant by those contexts. <br /><br />In any case, we seem to agree that, contrary to what Bennett seems to be arguing, all this comes at no extra ideological (nor, as you point out, ontological) cost if one accepts the standard (modal realism + counterpart theory) package. Right?Gabriele Contessahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-78078877628959048112009-08-07T13:19:56.781-04:002009-08-07T13:19:56.781-04:00I think I'd put the point slightly differently...I think I'd put the point slightly differently. Bennett is right that the one-thinger needs a richer repertoire of modal properties than the multi-thinger. But the counterpart theorist <i>has</i> a rich repertoire of modal properties, underwritten by different respects of similarity—so that extra ideological bill is paid in full by counterpart theory. (Or if there are any outstanding charges, they're just those incurred by counterpart theory itself.) And if counterpart theory can be had cheaply, then the one-thinger has nothing left to be embarrassed about. Of course, if the multi-thinger could give a reductive account of her extra <i>ontology</i>, the same would hold.<br /><br />It sounds like Bennett may be using "property" in a more loaded way than I just did, in which case I may have to pick my words a bit more carefully, but the point still stands. Costs are no big deal, if you can pay them.Jeffhttp://phiblog.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.com