tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post4323243595662485747..comments2022-03-25T07:20:12.468-04:00Comments on Matters of Substance: Contest: Can a property be a person?Gabriele Contessahttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13607158011908969169noreply@blogger.comBlogger79125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-23638620455120680932010-04-09T13:03:34.618-04:002010-04-09T13:03:34.618-04:00By the way, I found very interesting some of the a...By the way, I found very interesting some of the arguments that claimed that the conjunction of <em>God is a property</em> and <em>God is simple</em> are incoherent. <br /><br />I didn't select one of them as the winner, as they all depended on the assumption that if any person is a property, it is a simple God, and that assumption was not adequately justified. <br /><br />This may provide an argument against the conjunction of realism about properties and divine simplicity. One way out of that would be to say that "x is (say) a person" has a different truthmaker in the case of creatures and in the case of God--in our case, the truthmaker is our instantiating personhood, while in the case of God it's his instantiating divine personhood. I do not know whether realism can handle this, but maybe it can. After all, sparse realism already agrees that "x is an F" is not always to be understood by way of instantiation of Fness, because there may be no such thing as Fness, so it may be just a small step from that to say that "x is an F" is understood as affirming an instantiation of F1ness, while "y is an F" is understood as affirming an instantiation of F2ness. <br /><br />But my purposes aren't to defend the conjunction of simplicity and realism, but only the conjunction of the weaker thesis that God=divinity with realism. And that survives these arguments.<br /><br />Clayton's E5 (and E8) argument is powerful, but I don't have as strong a notion of ontological categories as he does. I am happy with the possibility of ontic categories that criss-cross (e.g., some persons are angels, and some are animals, while some animals aren't persons (though as far as I know, all angels are persons)).Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-43920423773419471572010-04-07T19:06:14.744-04:002010-04-07T19:06:14.744-04:00Cool: I would like to record my opinion that I thi...Cool: I would like to record my opinion that I think that E5 was indeed the correct choice. Congrats. :)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-56702279204984859002010-04-07T16:07:46.805-04:002010-04-07T16:07:46.805-04:00By the way, let me apologize for the delay with th...By the way, let me apologize for the delay with the judging. March was a very busy month.<br /><br />In case anybody is curious, here are the names of the entrants who did not wish to withhold their names:<br /><br />E1: Andrew M. Bailey<br />E2: Andrew Jaeger<br />E3: Andrew Jaeger<br />E4: Lewis Powell<br />E5: Clayton Littlejohn<br />E6: Chris Tweedt<br />E8: Clayton Littlejohn<br />E9: James Bejon<br />E10: James Bejon<br />E11: Jonathan D. Jacobs<br />E14: Tim Pawl<br />E15: Christian Lee<br />E16: GJE Rutten<br />E17: Ian Hegger<br />E18: Tim Pawl<br />E19: Andrew Jaeger<br />E20: Heath White<br />E21: Brandon N. Towl<br />E22: Heath White<br />E23: Matteo Morganti<br />E24: Raymond W. Aldred<br />E25: James Chastek<br />E26: Joshua Rasmussen<br />E27: Josh Rasmussen<br />E28: Tim PawlAlexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-6004388870944287112010-04-07T16:05:14.529-04:002010-04-07T16:05:14.529-04:00The winner of the best argument is E5 by Clayton L...The winner of the best argument is E5 by Clayton Littlejohn. Congratulations, Clayton!<br /><br />The winner of the random draw is Matteo Morganti. Congratulations, Matteo!<br /><br />I am emailing the winners to confirm their email address prior to sending them their prizes.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-16536178468385718482010-04-07T15:48:43.936-04:002010-04-07T15:48:43.936-04:00Shall we consider it official that it was all a tr...Shall we consider it official that it was all a trick to obtain free support for some work in progress? ;)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-56095478173150296482010-03-25T11:19:08.073-04:002010-03-25T11:19:08.073-04:00Still no word? Weren't the winners supposed t...Still no word? Weren't the winners supposed to be chosen last week? Why the delay?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-72794509228491312532010-03-21T13:10:57.868-04:002010-03-21T13:10:57.868-04:00So....who won the contest? =)So....who won the contest? =)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-43428040554355651482010-03-19T15:55:40.905-04:002010-03-19T15:55:40.905-04:00E26, good point about G=I=P. Perhaps someone can d...E26, good point about G=I=P. Perhaps someone can dig their heals and say that God is a property but that God does not have (or even lack, per E27) the property of being a property. That's the only way out I see.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-66022626744034839552010-03-17T17:13:21.954-04:002010-03-17T17:13:21.954-04:00E28 here. March 17th, 2010 11:17am, thanks for th...E28 here. March 17th, 2010 11:17am, thanks for the comment. You say:<br /><br />"So, if a person--a substance---is a property, then THAT thing is identical to its properties. Not so for properties that are not persons."<br /><br />Consider: G is the thing that is simple, a person, and a property. G has the properties: being-Identical-with-G (call it 'I') and being-a-Property (call it 'P'). So, by simplicity, G is identical with I and also identical with P (G=I=P). And so anything that instantiates P--that is, anything that is a property--is going to instantiate I. So all properties are identical with G. I grant that if there is a property that is simple and a person, then, as you say, that thing is identical to its properties. And I grant that, as you say, for any property that is not a person, it is not identical to its properties. But I only grant the latter because the antecedent is vacuous. If there is a simple property, then it is the only property.<br /><br />You also say: "So, IF God is a property, I do think it is reasonable to suppose that God is identical to all God's properties (at least to all his essential ones)."<br /><br />I agree with this, and would use it as part of a modus tollens (maybe you would, too). I deny the consequent: It isn't reasonable to suppose that God is identical to all God's (essential) properties. Here's why: Suppose that God is identical to all his (essential) properties. If God is identical to all his (essential) properties, then he is identical to the properties: being-Identical-with-G (call it 'I') and bearing-at-least-One-property (call it 'O'). So I=O. So anything that bears at least one property will be identical to God. Everything bears at least one property. And so everything is identical to God. But it is false that everything is identical to God [I have an inflated ego, but not that inflated!] So our starting assumption was false. And thus, it is false that God is identical to all his (essential) properties. Since it has been shown false, it would be unreasonable for us to suppose it. And so, by modus tollens, God is not a property. <br /><br />Thanks again for the comment.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-46593739280784035242010-03-17T11:17:02.634-04:002010-03-17T11:17:02.634-04:00E28, you've reminded me that one reason to thi...E28, you've reminded me that one reason to think that if X is simple that X is identical to its properties is based upon a constituent ontology according to which an entity's properties are parts or constituents of itself. Thus, if something is simple (has no parts or constituents), it has no properties distinct from itself. But someone might think that a constituent ontology holds only for substances and not for properties in general. So, if a person--a substance---is a property, then THAT thing is identical to its properties. Not so for properties that are not persons.<br /><br />I think it's best to reject consituent ontology for both substances and properties. But then what motivation is there to think a simple God is a property at all?<br /><br />So, IF God is a property, I do think it is reasonable to suppose that God is identical to all God's properties (at least to all his essential ones).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-85949764197619515992010-03-16T16:55:30.058-04:002010-03-16T16:55:30.058-04:00Entry E28 (Fri Mar 5 08:05:32 2010):
Author of E1...<b>Entry E28</b> (Fri Mar 5 08:05:32 2010):<br />Author of E14 and E18 here. <br /><br />First, I agree with the March 3rd anonymous that my argument in E14 would be stronger if we replaced "being abstract" with "being a property".<br /><br />Second, here's an argument which attempts to show that no property is simple. If God is simple, then, God cannot be a property. This argument presupposes an abundant view of platonic properties. <br /><br />1. Suppose that there is a property that is simple, call it G (for reductio).<br />2. G is identical with any property that G instantiates (given simplicity).<br />3. G instantiates the property of being-identical-with-G. (assume).<br />4. G instantiates the property of having-at-least-one-property, call the property of instantiating-at-least-one-property O (assume).<br />5. So the property G is identical with the property of having-at-least-one-property (G=O)(2, 4).<br />6. For anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.<br />7. So, for anything that exists, it has the property G (5,6).<br />8. G is identical with the property of being-identical-with-G (2,3). <br />9. So, for anything that exists, it has the property of being-identical-with-G (7,8).<br />10. So, anything that exists is identical with G (9).<br />11. So G is the only thing that exists.<br />12. But 11 is false, since you and I exist, and we aren't the property G.<br />13. Contradiction!<br />14. So our assumption is false: it is not the case that there is a property that is simple.<br /><br />a quick proof of 6<br />6a. For anything that exists, it is either abstract or concrete.<br />6b. Any abstract thing instantiates abstractness, and so instantiates at least one property.<br />6c. Any concrete thing instantiates concreteness, and so instantiates at least one property.<br />6d. Thus, for anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.<br /><br />Nothing can be both simple and a property. And so nothing can be simple, a property, and a person. And so God cannot be a property.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-3411340155661423922010-03-16T16:53:49.545-04:002010-03-16T16:53:49.545-04:00Winners will be selected this week.
Entry E27 (Mo...Winners will be selected this week.<br /><br /><b>Entry E27</b> (Mon Mar 1 09:38:27 2010):<br />I realize it's past the deadline, but this isn't actually a new argument. Rather, it's a more elegant (simpler) way of stating E26. I want to make sure that the power of E26 is fully appreciated. :) <br /><br />Suppose there is a necessarily existing person, P, such that P = divinity and P is simple.<br /><br />1. I have a property Q (e.g., being a person), such that either it is necessary that P has Q or it is necessary that P lacks Q. (premise)<br /><br />2. If it is necessary that P has Q, then P = Q. (by divine simplicity)<br /><br />3. Therefore, if it is necessary that P has Q, then I am divine [have divinity]. (1, 2)<br /><br />4. I am not divine. (premise)<br /><br />5. Therefore, it is necessary that P lacks Q. (1, 3, 4)<br /><br />6. If it is necessary that P lacks Q, then it is necessary that Q exists. (premise)<br /> 6a. Necessarily, if P lacks Q, then Q is lacked by P. (premise)<br /> 6b. Necessarily, if Q is lacked by P, then Q exists. (serious actualism)<br /> 6c. Therefore, if necessarily, P lacks Q, then necessarily, Q exists. <br /> (6a, 6b, distribution axiom) <br /><br />7. If it is necessary that Q exists, then P = Q. (premise: because P, as simple creator, can exist alone)<br /><br />8. Therefore, if it is necessary that P lacks Q, then I am divine. (1, 6, 7)<br /><br />9. Therefore, it is not necessary that P lacks Q, which contradicts (5). (4, 8)<br /><br />Note: "I" may stand for anything that isn't divine.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-12572773377775924602010-03-15T19:48:23.299-04:002010-03-15T19:48:23.299-04:00Any word on the winners?Any word on the winners?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-80064367277053546292010-03-11T18:13:31.469-05:002010-03-11T18:13:31.469-05:00Author of E14 and E18 here.
First, I agree with...Author of E14 and E18 here. <br /><br />First, I agree with the March 3rd anonymous that my argument in E14 would be stronger if we replaced "being abstract" with "being a property".<br /><br />Second, here's an argument which attempts to show that no property is simple. Thus, if God is simple, God cannot be a property. This argument presupposes an abundant view of platonic properties. <br /><br />1. Suppose that there is a property that is simple, call it G (for reductio).<br />2. G is identical with any property that G instantiates (given simplicity).<br />3. G instantiates the property of being-identical-with-G. (premise).<br />4. G instantiates the property of having-at-least-one-property, call the property of instantiating-at-least-one-property O (premise).<br />5. So the property G is identical with the property of having-at-least-one-property (G=O)(2, 4).<br />6. For anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.<br />7. So, for anything that exists, it has the property G (5,6).<br />8. G is identical with the property of being-identical-with-G (2,3). <br />9. So, for anything that exists, it has the property of being-identical-with-G (7,8).<br />10. So, anything that exists is identical with G (9).<br />11. So G is the only thing that exists.<br />12. But 11 is false, since you and I exist, and we aren't the property G.<br />13. Contradiction!<br />14. So our assumption is false: it is not the case that there is a property that is simple.<br /><br />a quick proof of 6:<br />6a. For anything that exists, it is either abstract or concrete.<br />6b. Any abstract thing instantiates abstractness, and so instantiates at least one property.<br />6c. Any concrete thing instantiates concreteness, and so instantiates at least one property.<br />6d. Thus, for anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.<br /><br />Nothing can be both simple and a property. And so nothing can be simple, a property, and a person. And so God cannot be a property.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-80327314604682193312010-03-03T14:33:38.720-05:002010-03-03T14:33:38.720-05:00Entry E14 is interesting to me, but it can be stre...Entry E14 is interesting to me, but it can be strengthened by replacing 'being abstract' with 'being a property':<br /><br />1. God is identical with any property that God has (given simplicity).<br />2. Thus, God is identical with the property of being Divine.<br />3. the property of being divine has the property of being a property (all properties have this property given realism).<br />4. Thus, God has the property of being a property (2,3, Leibniz's Law).<br />5. Thus, God is identical with the property of being a property (1).<br />6. Greenness has the property of being a property (premise).<br />7. Thus, Greenness has the property of being Divine (2,5,6)*<br />8. But Greenness is not divine.<br />9. Contradiction!<br /><br />A rejoinder is to deny (3). It might be said that God = divinity, but that divinity doesn't have the property of being a property. Divinity is a property by virtue of being exemplified by something (namely itself), but not by virtue of having the property of being a property.<br /><br />Of course, if divinity doesn't have the property of being a property, it might be thought that it <i>lacks</i> that property--in which case we could run the second half of E26.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-36793296651069510302010-02-28T14:54:30.464-05:002010-02-28T14:54:30.464-05:00E23: thanks for that. Some quick comments:
1. I d...E23: thanks for that. Some quick comments:<br /><br />1. I do agree that one may reject actualism--but I take it that many would find that move to be a heft cost.<br /><br />2. If one denies that P is essentially a person, is one prepared to also deny that there is <i>any</i> property that P has (or lacks) essentially? If not, then one may run the argument using one of those properties instead. <br />:)<br /><br />3. I see no premise of E26 that entails that P, though simple, is distinct from its essential properties (thus, that P creates its essential properties if P creates everything "outside" itself). Perhaps your thought is just that someone could say that P is simple and divine yet distinct from its essential properties. I think that's an option, but it's in tension with the doctrine of divine simplicity that Alex is interested in defending (else: why propose that God = divinity if we can say that God has distinct properties that he isn't identical with?)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-467402558565026212010-02-28T11:31:36.964-05:002010-02-28T11:31:36.964-05:00Thanks for the reply! One last (on the part of E23...Thanks for the reply! One last (on the part of E23, at least) rejoinder:<br /><br />You're now saying that if P has Q in some world, then P has it necessarily. But again this assumes that P cannot have accidental properties. Perhaps God cannot rid himself of his/her essential properties, but certainly s/he can 'delete' his/her accidental ones; and that Q is essential has yet to be demonstrated! (In a word, I doubt 6): having Q in a possible world only suffices for Q to be an accidental property).<br /><br />Next: one can reject actualism for more than contradictory properties such as being a square circle; my point is not that one should reject the existence of properties that cannot be exemplified, but rather that one should not infer the existence of a property from the fact that it isn't exemplified! (Perhaps the lacking/not having distinction is relevant here, but I don't get its ontological significance - aren't you simply assuming that the former has existential import?).<br /><br />As for my 1), let me try again. The argument says:<br /><br />7c. Therefore, if (3), then possibly, P is the only entity that exists.<br />(7a, 7b)<br /><br />7d. If any essential property of P is not identical to P, then ~ (7c).<br />(necessity of identity)<br /><br />7e. Therefore, If (3), then P is identical to all its essential properties.<br />(7c, 7d)<br /><br />Now, you allowed that 7c should really read<br /><br />7c* Therefore, if (3), then possibly, there are no created entities 'outside' of P.<br /><br />But the negation of 7c* follows from 7d iff an essential property of P which is not identical to P is something 'outside' P and created by P. So the argument IS assuming that God creates his/her own essential properties.<br /><br />As for the original 7c, if one thinks that being divine is distinct from God, s/he will certainly reject it, saying that if God doesn't create, God is not the only existing thing: s/he exists, but also his/her essential properties do.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-67293267189087989992010-02-28T09:11:37.875-05:002010-02-28T09:11:37.875-05:00...one might of course suggest that if p doesn'......one might of course suggest that if p doesn't have q, it doesn't thereby lack q; rather it's just false that p has q. In this way, one might reject (5) by saying that p neither has q nor lacks q. I personally think that's the best way out, but I don't think it's an easy way out.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-45007495448387695562010-02-28T09:01:31.134-05:002010-02-28T09:01:31.134-05:00Dear Anonymous,
Thanks for those further clarific...Dear Anonymous,<br /><br />Thanks for those further clarifications; I apologize for being too quick.<br /><br />re: 1) I'm not sure I understand your reasoning there. Perhaps you could elaborate. <br /><br />re: 2) Thanks for pressing this. I think E26 meant for (5) to include a necessity operator: necessarily, p has q xor p lacks q. Thanks for bringing that to light. If (5) is stated as I just did, then here's how I think (14) follows from (5) and (6) + P existing necessarily:<br /><br />(14) says that if p lacks q then it is necessary that p lacks q. Suppose p lacks q, but there's a world w in which p exists and p doesn't lack q. In w, p has q (from 5). Thus, in w, p essentially has q (from 6): in other words, it has q in every world in which it exists. Thus, p has q in our world. Thus, p doesn't lack q in our world (from 5), which contradicts the starting assumption. Thus, if p lacks q, there's no world in which p exists but lacks q. p exists in every world; therefore, if p lacks q, then it is necessary that p lacks q. <br /><br />As for God deciding to stop being a person, someone might try that way out. However, notice that the same argument structure can be used for ANY property I have--including being a substance or having abilities (if there are such properties). Could God decide to have no abilities or to cease being a substance? <br /><br />re: 3) Oh, I see now what you were saying: sorry i was too quick before. :)<br /><br />My sense is that if one rejects the existence of properties that cannot be exemplified, (I wonder why one might reject those sorts of things but not reject propositions that can't be true...), one shouldn't say that such properties are lacked by me. Rather, one should say that I'm not a square circle (say) by virtue of it being false that both I have being a square and I have being a circle. Does that seem right?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-42758384451388024492010-02-28T04:17:24.421-05:002010-02-28T04:17:24.421-05:00Sorry, let me be clearer, these answers are way to...Sorry, let me be clearer, these answers are way too quick (thanks for them, anyway!):<br />1) The argument says that if God doesn't create anything, then either his essential properties exist and are identical to God or they don't exist. This MEANS to assume that God creates his/her own essential properties.<br />2) From 5) and 6) it only follows that if P lacks Q then Q is not an essential property of P. (Indeed, it is not absurd to think that God can decide to stop being a person). (The fact that God necessarily exists seems to play no role here).<br />3) My point re. 16) was exactly about actualism: I lack the property of being a square circle, should I believe that this makes the property of being a square circle exist?<br />4) The shoe counterexample: of course! I didn't say 'P lacks Q *iff* Q doesn't exist'.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-77889549994274179442010-02-27T23:31:19.332-05:002010-02-27T23:31:19.332-05:00Does E26 assume that God creates his/her own being...<b>Does E26 assume that God creates his/her own being a person (premise 7))?</b> No--the argument for it merely supposes that P creates everything "outside" itself.<br /><br /><b>Couldn't premise 14) be countered by saying the P lacks Q but could have Q as an accidental property?</b> Well, that premise actually follows from (5) and (6) together with the assumption that P is a necessary being. The vulnerable premise (I think) might be (6)--that if P has Q, then it essentially has Q. I think it's pretty plausible that if something is a person, it is essentially a person (I think this is especially plausible for a divine person); thus, I think it's pretty plausible that <i>if</i> something is a person by virtue of having the property of being a person, it essentially has that property.<br /><br /><b>Why believe, as in premise 16), that if P lacks Q then Q exists?</b> Premise (16) says that (necessarily) if Q is lacked by P, then Q exists. The reason is serious actualism: it's not possible for Q to be anything, let alone lacked by P, if Q doesn't exist. If one were to state (16) in quantificational logic, then I think we'd see that it also falls out of Quinean meta-ontology...<br /><br /><b>Doesn't it make sense to think that P lacks Q because Q doesn't exist?</b> My shoe lacks being a person, but that doesn't mean that there's no such property!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-88376833200671964712010-02-27T18:14:17.293-05:002010-02-27T18:14:17.293-05:00Hi from E23.
Does E26 assume that God creates his/...Hi from E23.<br />Does E26 assume that God creates his/her own being a person (premise 7))? If so, is this convincing?<br />Couldn't premise 14) be countered by saying the P lacks Q but could have Q as an accidental property?<br />Why believe, as in premise 16), that if P lacks Q then Q exists? Doesn't it make sense to think that P lacks Q because Q doesn't exist? Incidentally, this seems to be what the author thinks would be the case if P decided not to create anything, (again premise 7)), so there appears to be a tension between premises 7) and 16).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-71648692831587392592010-02-27T10:05:03.673-05:002010-02-27T10:05:03.673-05:00Alex,
I don't believe one can escape E26 mere...Alex,<br /><br />I don't believe one can escape E26 merely by supposing that all positive properties apply to God analogically. If all properties apply to God analogically, then P lacks Q (if you accept (5)). But given (14)-(22), P doesn't lack Q.<br /><br />A way to get out of the argument is to say that P neither has Q <i>nor</i> lacks Q. But that seems to be a very hard way out.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-7373007418515291622010-02-25T22:29:04.989-05:002010-02-25T22:29:04.989-05:00By the way, an odd thing is that nobody has yet gi...By the way, an odd thing is that nobody has yet given references to the literature for the claim that no person (or maybe more generally no substance) is a property. Is there nothing much in the literature?Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8027844571839885250.post-59135069038544144162010-02-25T22:27:46.796-05:002010-02-25T22:27:46.796-05:00As for E25, I am tempted to say that no name of a ...As for E25, I am tempted to say that no name of a classification is said of many univocally. This in turn lets me deny 4d.<br /><br />Names of classifications seem to me be words like: "greenness", "mammality", "humanity". But these things are not said of many univocally. "Greenness" is said of only one entity--the classification or property <em>greenness</em>. Grass is green, but grass isn't greenness.<br /><br />But maybe "n is said of x" does not mean that "x is n" is true. Maybe "n is said of x" means that "x has n" is true. We do want to say that "greenness" is said of many in this sense--many things "have greenness". But if that's how we read "said of", with "has" instead of "is", then 4b is to be denied. 4b is supposed to follow from a general thesis about person's names. But that general thesis is false on this reading. For instance "Alexander" is not said of anybody--it is not said of me, since "Alexander has Alexander" is false, as <em>I</em> am not a property.<br /><br />OK, maybe I'm wrong about what the names of classifications are. Maybe they're things like "green", "mammal" and "human". I guess then the argument works. In that case, the names of classifications are said non-univocally (analogously, I suppose) of the classification and of the things that fall under the classification. So now we have two ways of saying the name of a classification of something. Type I: "(the classification) green is (the classification) green" (this is identity; it sounds better in Greek than in English), and type II: "grass is green" (this is predication). In 4b, we then distinguish. The name "Shirley" cannot be said (type I) of many univocally, but only of Shirley, just as green cannot be said (type I) of many univocally, but only of the classification green. But the name "Shirley" can be said (type II) of many, just as green can.Alexander R Prusshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05989277655934827117noreply@blogger.com