Sunday, October 19, 2014

CFP: Society for the Metaphysics of Science (1st Annual Conference)

The Society for the Metaphysics of Science will be holding its first annual conference on September 17-18, 2015 at Rutgers University – Newark.  As well as various presentations, the conference will also feature the first organizational meeting of the Society which will elect officers, begin to make various policies, plan future conferences, etc. Both those interested in presenting papers and/or participating in the Society are invited to the conference. (For more information on the society, see the Society for the Metaphysics of Science web page.)

At the conference, presentations will be 40 minutes.  Submissions should be on a topic in the metaphysics of science broadly construed, of no more than 6,000 words and should include an abstract of ~150 words and a word count.  All papers must employ gender-neutral language and be prepared for blind review. 

Submissions must be made using the Easychair online submission system at: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=sms2015.  The submission deadline is March 1, 2015.  Notifications of acceptance will be delivered by May 15, 2015.  The conference will have a $50 registration fee.  (The fee will be waived for graduate students.)

Our keynote speaker will be Barry Loewer, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, and all other sessions will comprise submitted papers.

Questions may be gmailed to ken.aizawa.

Program Committee:
Ken Aizawa, Rutgers University, Newark, Chair
Carl Gillett, Northern Illinois University
Alyssa Ney, Rochester University
Thomas Polger, University of Cincinnati
Jessica Wilson, University of Toronto

Monday, September 15, 2014

'Only Powers Can Confer Dispositions'

I'm delighted to announce that my paper 'Only Powers Can Confer Dispositions' is now forthcoming in The Philosophical Quarterly!

Tuesday, May 27, 2014

New Journal: Ergo

First issue: http://www.ergophiljournal.org/

Julia Jorati (OSU) on a paper in early modern by Paul Lodge (Oxford):
http://philosophymodsquad.wordpress.com/

Anna Mahtani (LSE) on a paper by Michael Caie (Pittsburgh):
http://choiceandinference.com/http://m-phi.blogspot.ca/

Ellen Clark (Oxford) on a paper in philosophy of biology by
Christopher Hitchcock (Caltech) and Joel Velasco (Texas Tech):
http://philosomama.blogspot.co.uk/

Thomas Nadelhoffer (Charleston) on a paper in experimental philosophy
by John Turri (Waterloo):
http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/xphi/

Tuesday, January 7, 2014

RIP E. J. (Jonathan) Lowe (1950–2014)

I have just heard the terrible news that Jonathan Lowe passed away on January. This is an enormous loss for philosophy in general and for metaphysics in particular, as well as, of course, for all those who knew him. Below is the memorial notice by his Durham colleagues Robin Hendry and Matthew Ratcliffe.
It is with great sadness that we announce the death of Professor E. J. (Jonathan) Lowe. Jonathan was born in Dover, England, on 24th March 1950. He went to Cambridge to read Natural Sciences in 1968, but changed to History after one year and was awarded a BA (first class) in 1971. After that, he switched to Philosophy and moved to Oxford, where he was awarded his BPhil and DPhil degrees in 1974 and 1975 (supervised by Rom Harré and Simon Blackburn respectively). After a brief period teaching at Reading, Jonathan joined the Department of Philosophy at Durham in 1980, where he stayed for the rest of his career. He was promoted to Senior Lecturer (1990), Reader (1992) and then Professor (1995). During his time at Durham, Jonathan established himself as one of the world’s leading philosophers, publishing twelve single-authored books, four co-edited collections and well over 200 articles in journals and edited volumes. His scholarship was strikingly broad, ranging from early modern philosophy through to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. His most important and sustained contributions were to philosophy of mind, philosophical logic and especially metaphysics. Jonathan adopted a realist conception of metaphysics as an autonomous discipline concerned with the fundamental structure of reality, as exemplified by his important book The Possibility of Metaphysics (OUP, 1998). Metaphysics, he maintained, should take common sense as its starting point, while at the same time acknowledging that aspects of common sense will need to be revised or abandoned. It should also retain a healthy respect for science but resist scientism, as the role of metaphysics is to illuminate features of reality that empirical scientific enquiry inevitably presupposes. It is therefore the most fundamental form of enquiry and - as Jonathan also emphasised – something that is extremely difficult to do. But, he insisted, there are no cheap short-cuts, and no piecemeal solutions to metaphysical problems. Metaphysics is to be done systematically and patiently. Jonathan’s approach drew inspiration from Aristotle and Locke, amongst others, both of whom retained a foothold in common sense. His metaphysical writings addressed a range of themes, including volition, personhood, agency, mental causation, identity, truth, essentialism and ontological categories. In recent years, one of his many notable achievements was the formulation of a new ‘four-category ontology’, which he proposed as a metaphysical foundation for all empirical scientific thought. The most detailed account of this appears in his book The Four-Category Ontology (OUP, 2006). Throughout his life, Jonathan was guided by a kind of faith in our ability to discover the fundamental structure of reality through metaphysical thought. He was spurred on by a constant sense of puzzlement, fascination and bewilderment at the existence and nature of reality, and would not let extraneous considerations distract him from a resolute search for truth. Those of us who knew him will remember him not just as a gifted and committed philosopher but also as an exceptionally kind, caring and generous person. He was an accomplished teacher, who did everything he possibly could to support, encourage, nurture and inspire his students, many of whom have gone on to have successful academic careers. He was similarly supportive of his colleagues at Durham and of the wider philosophical community. Philosophers from all over the world came to depend on him as a mentor and referee, and he would spend many hours most weeks writing carefully crafted letters of support. It was a privilege to work with Jonathan. He was always a keen participant in research events, at Durham and elsewhere, where he exercised his astonishingly refined critical skills and offered numerous insightful comments, without ever being dismissive. Even with his eminence in the profession and the many associated demands on his time, he insisted on doing his fair share (and usually more than his fair share) of administrative and teaching work. He was a reassuring presence in the department, who was always on hand to offer support, advice and consolation to colleagues. We are diminished by the loss of an outstanding philosopher and a great friend. Jonathan died on 5th January 2014, after several months of illness. He leaves his wife, Susan, and their two adult children, Rebecca and Tim.
UPDATE 1 [Jan 10, 2014]: A funeral service for Jonathan Lowe will be held at Durham Cathedral Monday 20th January at 1.30pm. All are welcome.

UPDATE 2 [Jan 11, 2014]: Another remembrance notice (by his former student Tuomas Tahko) can be found here.

Monday, December 2, 2013

CfA: Metaphysical Mayhem 2014!

Metaphysical Mayhem continues!

Rutgers University will be hosting a five day metaphysics summer school for graduate students, running May 19th-23rd, 2014, and featuring Karen Bennett, Shamik Dasgupta, Laurie Paul, Jonathan Schaffer, and Ted Sider.

All local (NY/NJ area) graduate students are invited to attend.
Non-local graduate students must apply to attend, by sending the following to jonathan.schaffer@rutgers.edu by January 10, 2014:
• A single page cover letter
• A curriculum vitae
• A writing sample on any topic in metaphysics
• A brief letter of recommendation (which need be no more than one paragraph), sent from a professor familiar with your work

Applicants will be notified by February 1, 2014. Housing and possibly some limited financial support will be available for non-local graduate students. 

Monday, November 18, 2013

New Paper: "One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism without Ordinary-Object Eliminativism"

Have you always wanted to be a mereological nihilist but were too afraid to try? Do you like your cats, apples, and tables too much to be an eliminativist about ordinary objects? Then non-eliminative nihilism might be the right philosophical position for you!!! 

Now forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy "One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism without Ordinary-Object Eliminativism"!!!

It used to be a small paper (and some of the ideas in it were discussed in an old post on this blog); it grew into a 12,000-word monster but I'm very happy with it. 

Abstract: Mereological nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects—i.e. objects with proper material parts. One of the main advantages of mereological nihilism is that it allows its supporters to avoid a number of notorious philosophical puzzles. However, it seems to offer this advantage only at the expense of certain widespread and deeply entrenched beliefs. In particular, it is usually assumed that mereological nihilism entails eliminativism about ordinary objects—i.e. the counterintuitive thesis that there are no such things as tables, apples, cats, and the like. In this paper, I argue that this assumption is false—mereological nihilists do not need to be eliminativists about tables, apples, or cats. Non-eliminativist nihilists claim that all it takes for there to be a cat is that there are simples arranged cat-wise. More specifically, non-eliminative nihilists argue that expressions such as ‘the cat’ in sentences such as ‘The cat is on the mat’ do not refer to composite objects but only to simples arranged cat-wise and compare this metaphysical discovery to the scientific discovery that ‘water’ refers to dihydrogen oxide. Non-eliminative nihilism, I argue, is not only a coherent position, but it is preferable to its more popular, eliminativist counterpart, as it enjoys the key benefits of nihilism without incurring the prohibitive costs of eliminativism. Moreover, unlike conciliatory strategies adopted by eliminative nihilists, non-eliminative nihilism allow its supporters to account not only for how we can assert something true by saying ‘The cat is on the mat’ but also for how we can believe something true by believing that the cat is on the mat.

Favourite sentence in the paper: "So, unless one takes metaphysics to be merely the shadow of grammar, one should not take the fact that certain constructions are grammatical while others are not to be evidence for or against a certain metaphysical view."

A special thank-you to Dan Korman and Trenton Merricks, who gave me precious feedback on a very early draft.

Monday, September 9, 2013

Hyperintensional Metaphysics (Again)

As a followup, of sorts, to my last post about hyperintensionality, I’d like to announce that I have a draft paper available extolling the virtues of using hyperintensional resources in metaphysics. It’s short, but tries to make the case that hyperintensional metaphysics is the way of the future! And not merely for the metaphysics of representation, but for the metaphysics of the non-representational world as well.

The paper: Hyperintensional Metaphysics