According to some versions of the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is identical with the property of divinity. I am planning on writing up a (limited) defense of this identity, and to that end I am hereby offering an argument contest with very modest prizes, with the hope of getting really good submissions to argue against in my paper (unless perhaps I am convinced by the submissions!).
Here is the task for the contest. Grant for the sake of the argument that:
- There is at least one necessarily existing person.
- Realism about properties is correct.
The reason why I ask that the arguments grant these assumptions is that I am not interested in variants on the following two arguments: (1) All properties are necessary beings, every person is contingent, and, therefore, no property is a person; (2) There are no properties, and, therefore, no property is a person.
The deadline is the end of February, 2010, Central Time.
I will give a $50 amazon.com gift certificate to the person who, in my subjective judgment, has submitted the most powerful, reasonably brief (there is an approximately 6000 character limit) original argument (of course, an original argument can build on arguments by others, including arguments submitted to this contest). If your argument has already appeared in published work, you may use it for the contest--but don't give a reference in your submission, because then I'll think that it's not original, because I'll be judging blindly. In case I can't decide on the winner, I will do a random draw among those I consider to be finalists.
However, it is not necessary to submit an original argument to enter. All entrants who give a serious argument that was not already posted by the time their entry was submitted, even if that argument is not their own (hopefully it comes with a reference!), will have a chance to win a $30 amazon.com gift certificate by random drawing. While the best-argument prize you can enter several times to improve your chances (with different arguments!), the random drawing you get only one chance at, no matter how many entries you submit.
Submissions must be posted via the form in this link. This ensures that judging will be done blindly--the entries are separated from the entrant names. But to be eligible for a prize, you must include your real name.
From time to time, I'll be posting serious submissions as comments on this blog post, without the entrant's name. (What counts as original will be relative to what was posted at the time.) At the end of the contest, I may post a comment identifying by name those entrants who checked the box releasing their names.
Prior to posting, you might want to see this discussion of the issue, as well as the comments below. This may also keep down the submissions of non-original arguments.
The comments to this post are open to discussion of the arguments posted. I may, for instance, post critical responses. You are free to submit an improved version of your argument--or a supplement to your argument--to be judged together with your original argument (in that case, reference your first version by entry number). But only arguments submitted via the above-linked form count as entries.
I am the final arbiter of how the contest proceeds, and no appeal is possible. I reserve the right to disqualify entries for any reasons I see fit. If computer problems destroy entries or fail to record them correctly, then that's just your tough luck. The winner is responsible for all the tax implications of the prize.
The arguments should not be written as complete papers. A simple, fairly concise numbered or informal argument suffices.
First entry received!
ReplyDeleteEntry E1:
Sat Jan 30 13:54:42 2010
P1. Necessarily, x is a property iff: possibly, something instantiates x.
P2. Necessarily, no person is instantiated.
P3. Necessarily, no person is a property (from P1 and P2).
C. Therefore, it is not the case that there exists a property which is (also) a person (from P3).
In defense of P1: This drops out of a theory of properties (let's call it `T') according to which properties are respects in which things might agree or differ. T is superior to its close cousin according to which properties are respects in which things agree or differ; for T it allows that there are uninstantiated properties. The central cost of T is that it disallows uninstantiable properties, properties that *couldn't* be instantiated. Those with anything close to Aristotelian leanings will not think this is much of a cost.
In defense of P2: Something is instantiated just if there are examples or instances of that thing. There couldn't be examples of a person. Persons can be examples of properties, of course (I can be an example of the property _being a philosopher_). And there are examples of the property _being a person_ (that is to say, there are people). But there are no examples of any given person. Any theory of instantiation or exemplification must respect this constraint; for we have no grip on a notion of instantiation of exemplification, say I, that allows that a person might have examples or instances.
And here's my rejoinder. :-)
ReplyDeleteI worry that P2 begs the question. Suppose greenness is a person, a person whom we may name "Gerda Greene". Then there is an example of Gerda Greene--indeed, any green thing is an example of Gerda Greene. (It's not even necessary for this that Gerda Greene be green, since properties don't in general self-predicate.) What's absurd here?
Just to inspire some more ideas, here's a stir-crazy version of Platonism--or, at least, it's arguable that it's a version of Platonism.
ReplyDelete1. There are infinitely many necessarily existing meditators.
2. For each necessarily existing meditator T, there exists a unique concept C such that necessarily T spends most of its time meditating on C.
3. No two necessarily existing meditators spend the majority of their time meditating on the same concept.
Meditator Platonism now says:
4. A predicate P represents a property Q iff Q is a necessarily existing meditator such that Q spends most of its time meditating on the concept expressed by "P".
5. An object o has a property Q iff o satisfies the concept that Q spends most of its time meditating on.
Since only persons meditate, if Meditator Platonism is true, then there are properties (infinitely many of them) and every property is a person.
I reject Meditator Platonism as a version of Platonism for two reasons:
A. Claim (1) is incompatible with theism, and there is good reason to believe theism.
B. Platonists ought to say that exemplification is explanatory of the truth of propositions that predicate the possession of properties, while on Meditator Platonism, there does not appear to be any such explanatory relation. Though maybe one could bulk up Meditator Platonism to produce such.
Entry E2 (E3 is identical):
ReplyDeleteSat Jan 30 16:18:37 2010
I think the following argument is very close to the argument of the first submitted entry (in fact I think what is behind the above argument is similar to what is behind the following argument, and therefore think the following argument is prone to failure (namely begs the question in (2)), but it might be an interesting attempt).
According to some realist theories of properties, premise (1) is true:
(1)If P is a property then it is possible for P to exist wholly in two locations at the same time.
Next, premise (2) appears true.
(2)It is not possible for person A to exist wholly in two locations at the same time.
(3) Therefore, Person A is not a property [1,2 modus tollens].
Now, (1) seems to follow straight from the theory of properties/universals in consideration. To reject it is simply to reject those theories. So, we'll let it go for now. To deny (2) is to say bi-location is possible (a consequence that might be welcomed by fans of Padre Pio). But perhaps, for God the consequence of bi-location is a good thing. So, it looks like there would be some who would be happy to reject (2)...but if bi-location of persons is impossible, then it looks like either persons aren't properties, or the theory of properties in consideration is false.
Entry E4:
ReplyDeleteSat Jan 30 20:49:41 2010
The following is an argument that no person can be identical to any property, which is consistent with realism about properties and with the existence of a necessary person:
Suppose for reductio that something (call it 'a') is both a person and a property.
1. Persons are essentially capable of intrinsic change.
2. So, a is essentially capable of intrinsic change.
3. So, a is capable of intrinsic change.
4. Properties are essentially incapable of intrinsic change.
5. So, a is essentially incapable of intrinsic change.
6. So, a is incapable of intrinsic change.
7. So, a is both capable and incapable of intrinsic change.
But, 7 is a contradiction, so nothing is both a person and a property.
The premises that require defense in this argument are 1 and 4.
One way to attempt to defend P1: Without defending any particular set of mental criteria for personhood, it does seem uncontroversial that personhood requires some relatively rich mental capacities. These mental capacities will themselves be capacities for intrinsic change. For example, suppose that personhood requires the capacity to make certain sorts of decisions (a mental activity resulting in the acquisition of an intention): Then, to be a person would require the capacity for acquiring certain sorts of intentions, but this is an (at least partially) intrinsic change. Note that the current formulation of P1 only requires a capacity for change, not the exemplification of change. This is because some might wish to postulate a necessarily existing person whose mental life is fixed in some particular manner for all eternity. While I think it is doubtful that any entity that exhibited no variation whatsoever in its mental life could be a person, the present argument requires only the possibility of variation in the mental life. This is relevant because, if the necessary person in question is supposed to be god, denying god the mere capacity to have had different mental states could have unwelcome fatalist results about how things could have been.
One way to attempt to defend P4: It is essential that properties admit of only extrinsic change, or else they would be unfit for some of their primary tasks. For instance, if the property of being an apple could undergo intrinsic changes, then it would be possible not just for there to be a change in which things are apples, but in what it is for something to be an apple. Since properties are postulated, in part, to explain the commonalities among all apples (past, present, future, as well as merely possible), anything capable of undergoing intrinsic change would be an unfit candidate for property-hood. Additionally, it will not due to allow for intrinsic changes to properties, but attempt to avoid this concern by explaining commonality by appeal to some unchangeable core/essence of the property. If the unchangeable essence of the purported property is employed for the relevant explanatory work of properties, the unchangeable essence itself would be a superior candidate for being the property in question.
Entry E5:
ReplyDeleteSat Jan 30 20:59:31 2010
It seems to me that the following is a promising argument against the following thesis:
(T) There exists a property which is (also) a person.
It would be too simple to say that properties can be repeatable but persons cannot. I do not think persons are repeatable, but there may well be properties that do not have multiple instances and there may well be properties that cannot be instantiated more than once. (This may be so even on a not particularly generous conception of property.) Now, suppose:
(1) Entities belong to their ontological categories essentially.
(2) While there might be properties that cannot be repeated, all properties belong to an ontological category that does not preclude repeatability by its very nature.
(3) All persons belong to an ontological category that does preclude repeatability by its very nature.
(4) On the hypothesis that there is something that is both a person and property, it would essentially belong to a category that precludes repeatability and a category that does not.
Now, (4) seems to me to be rather hard to accept, for it is hard to accept that one entity might belong to multiple ontological categories. If that's not bad enough, we might add that such a beast would likely have to have a kind of complexity that properties lack. Could something that lacked a multiplicity of intrinsic properties belong to multiple ontological categories if (1) is true? That seems doubtful.
Entry E6:
ReplyDeleteSat Jan 30 21:09:15 2010
To a Platonist, no property can also be a person, because to Platonists there are some subjects that are not themselves properties, and persons fit into this category.
A property's immanence in a subject and a subject's participation in a property are meant to provide an explanation for why a certain property is truly predicated of that subject. It is this explanatory role that distinguishes a non-property subject from a property. Properties must be referenced in explanations, and non-property subjects (thus persons) cannot be.
1. All properties must play a basic explanatory role.
Necessarily: every property is involved in the explanation as to why some X is F, and if that property is also F, then that property's being F is not further explained by another property.
Properties are just what fit this role. For example, that Socrates is an animal is explained by his participation in Animal (or Animality, or what have you). If Animal is an animal (supposing we accept self-predication), this does not require an additional explanans (because in that view it is analytically true). If we are to explain why Animal is a property, then of course this does require an additional explanans, but we are then not operating with F ('animal' in this example) anymore; we are dealing with 'property'. When asking whether Animal is a property, we are making 'Animal' into a subject. There can be (and are) properties that are subjects.
2. Persons cannot play a basic explanatory role.
All non-property subjects cannot play a basic explanatory role-- or an explanatory role at all, for that matter. Non-property subjects provide material for explanda, not explanans. All persons are non-property subjects. For this contest, I will make the weak claim only that persons cannot play a basic explanatory role. To explain 'X is F', in what cases could F be a person? Perhaps these:
a. Alex Pruss is Alex Pruss.
b. The person reading a submission is Alex Pruss.
However, I will explain why the objects of these sentences are not properties, and thus are explained linguistically, not metaphysically. First note that this is not a punt; the same property is called 'Animal' or 'Animality' despite the fact that one can be said of Socrates and not the other, and this is explained linguistically-- there are not two different properties corresponding to these terms. The fact that 'X is F' need not be explained metaphysically is revealed whenever the subject and object can be reversed to deliver the same meaning:
a'. Alex Pruss is Alex Pruss.
b'. Alex Pruss is the person reading a submission.
a' is analytically true and does not need a metaphysical explanation. b' references a property's immanence and says it is true of the subject. For example, instead of saying, "Socrates is musical," I could say, "Socrates is the musical (one)." The latter would allow a reversal of subject and object, just as between b and b'. (The 'F' corresponding to 'the person reading a submission' would be 'submission-reading person' or something like that.) A property's immanence is not the same as a property. In the case of b, the well-formed explanandum, 'Alex Pruss is a submission-reading person,' (the object here is a universal) has its object modified so as to instead refer to the property's immanence: 'Alex Pruss is the person reading a submission,' which allows a reversal of the subject and object: 'The person reading a submission is Alex Pruss.' This reversal was only possibly linguistically and would not have been possible with the well-formed explanandum. So in b', 'Alex Pruss' is not a property.
(continuation of E6)
ReplyDeleteAlso, this solution has the merit of circumventing the God and haecceity counterexamples by not requiring multiple exemplification of properties. F fulfills the property role even if it only could be instantiated once (as does "divinity" or "divine"), as long as it fulfills the role in 1 above.
This solution also gives reason for the beliefs that persons are exemplifiers but not exemplified, etc.
These are all nice arguments! Thanks, anonymous entrants!
ReplyDeleteSome comments.
E2: I wonder if "is located at" isn't equivocal or at least analogical between "property is located at x" and "person is located at x". A property P is located at x in the first sense of "located" iff an instance of P is located at x in the second sense of "located".
Also, I think I don't think it's true that every property can be multilocated. Some properties can't be located at all. For instance, if properties are abundant, then not being located in space or time is a property (it's had by the number 7) and it's not located anywhere. And being the tallest woman seems to be a property, and, necessarily, it has at most one instance, and hence is located at at most one place. Maybe these examples don't work if we have a sparse theory of properties, though.
E4 will, I think, have a lot of pull for a lot of people. Note that if it is sound, then not only is the doctrine that God=divinity ruled out, but also the doctrine that God exists. For it is a part of the traditional concept of God that he undergoes no intrinsic change. Of course there is a literature defending the possibility of a changeless God, including such folks as Boethius, and Kretzman and Stump. I think that literature is right.
I really like the argument in E4 against intrinsic change in properties. Still, I don't know if an intrinsic change in applehood would imply that it is something different to be an apple at one time rather than at another time. Maybe, what it is to be an F is the same as what it is to be a G iff Fness is numerically identical with Gness. If so, then even if Fness undergoes intrinsic change, as long as it remains itself, what it is to be an F is the same.
In E5, I think (3) needs a bit more justification. The relevant way in which a property is repeatable seems to be that multiple things can stand in a relation of instantiation to it. It doesn't mean that there can be more than one greenness--that would be trope theory, not Platonism. On the other hand, the relevant way in which a person is non-repeatable is that there can be only one of her, not that multiple entities can't stand in a relation of instantiation to it. However, here I may be showing a bias towards reading instantiation as a genuine relation. If one takes instantiation in some other way, maybe (3) is more strongly supportable?
Before I continue with the comments, let me note that the fact that I have objections to an argument doesn't mean the argument won't be the winner. :-)
ReplyDeleteE6 nicely brings in explanation.
I think to evaluate E6, we need to get clear on the relevant kinds of explanation. It is not crazy, though it is controversial, to think that persons play a basic causally explanatory role. Moreover, it seems plausible that if x is a truthmaker of p, then x plays an explanatory role in explaining what makes p true. But then Socrates will play an explanatory role--and if Socrates is not further reducible, then a basic explanatory role--in explaining what makes the proposition that Socrates exists true.
That's probably not the sort of explanatory role the author of E6 has in mind.
The author asks: "To explain 'X is F', in what cases could F be a person?" I am a bit confused here. Is the "is" an "is" of identity or of predication? If of predication, then 'X is F' is nonsense, whether F is a property or a person. 'X is (attribution) animality' is nonsense just as 'X is (attribution) Alex Pruss' is nonsense. If of identity, then it seems that we will say exactly the same kinds of things about the way F enters into explanations of 'X is F' when F is a property or a person or a dog or whatever. I feel like I'm missing a crucial part of the argument, maybe because I am having trouble with the claim that we call the same property 'Animal' and 'Animality'. In English, we call the property 'Animality'. (Greek is different.)
It seems to me that if Alex were identical with some property, say straightness, then Alex would play a basic explanatory role. He would enter into the explanation of why the ruler is straight--because it has the property Alex. (That may in the end be nonsense. But it hasn't yet been shown to be nonsense. And it's not ungrammatical. We can perhaps give whatever names to whatever we like. In particular, I can give the name "Alex" to greenness. And if I do that, then I will say that the ruler is straight because it exemplifies Alex, because it has Alex (but not because it is Alex--just as I wouldn't say the ruler is straight because it is straightness). So maybe it's not ungrammatical to say "the ruler is straight because it has the property Alex".)
Entry E7:
ReplyDeleteSat Jan 30 23:18:13 2010
For what it's worth, another argument:
(P1) A property is a way that some possible object could be.
(P2) if something's a way that some possible object could be, then it's ontologically derivative.
(P3) If any person is a property, then God is.
(P4) God is not ontologically derivative.
(P5) So, God is not a property.
(C) So, no person is a property.
The argument can be streamlined by dropping (P2) and (P4), and substituting in a plausible theological claim:
(P1) A property is a way that some possible object could be.
(P3) If any person is a property, then God is.
(P6) God is not a way that some possible object could be.
(P5) So, God is not a property.
(C) So, no person is a property.
The argument can be streamlined even further. Presumably, you're only concerned with whether *any* person could be a property because you're concerned with whether *God* is a property. If that's what's really at issue, then we can drop (P3), too.
Entry E8:
ReplyDeleteSun Jan 31 01:09:47 2010
Alex,
I think we can reformulate my argument by focusing on multiple instantiation rather than repeatability. (Persons belong to an ontological category whose members are not capable of being multiply instantiated but properties belong to a category whose members are not incapable of multiple instantiation even if some members of that collection cannot themselves be multiply instantiated.)
I also think the following sort of argument is worth considering:
(1) Entities belong to their ontological categories essentially.
(2') Properties belong to an ontological category composed entirely of members that stand in a different relation to time than temporally bound substances do.
(3') Persons do not belong to an ontological belong to an ontological category composed entirely of members that stand in a different relation to time than temporally bound substances do.
(4') On the hypothesis that there is something that is both a person and property, it would belong to an ontological category composed entirely of members that stand in a different relation to time than temporally bound substances do and not belong to it.
Indeed, the following strikes me as being pretty good:
(1'') Some persons are substances (e.g., you and I).
(2'') Some substances are not properties (e.g., you and I).
(3'') Persons belong to a common fundamental ontological category (1'' tells us that this is the category of substances).
(4'') Persons belong to no more than one common fundamental ontological category (4'' relatively trivial).
(5'') If some person were both a substance and a property, (~4'').
(C) No person is both a substance and a property.
E7 is pretty neat. I like the first formulation more than the second. It's based on an interesting, and to me quite compelling, view of properties. But it's compelling to me because I'm not a Platonist. If I were a Platonist, I think I would complain in the same way I complained against Meditator Platonism: properties should be explanatory of predication, but I don't know whether ways that things could be, if they are derivative, are explanatory of predication. But it's worth thinking about some more. And it does point up that there are many significant differences between different Platonisms.
ReplyDeleteE8, which is a new version of an earlier entry, and basically depends on the idea that ontological categories don't overlap. It reminds me of the substantive way in which ontological categories, as such, get used to define substance by Rosenkrantz and Hoffman (PPR, 1991). I am not sure, however, whether we have a priori reason to believe such claims as that fundamental ontological categories don't overlap.
But here's another way to develop the ontological categories. Say that an ousia is a primary, independent being. (This is what Aristotle does in Met Z.) This is our basic ontological category, and if Platonism is right, then it includes at least properties. Moreover, I think, it includes persons. But it doesn't include events (events aren't primary because they consist in instantiations of properties, or what befalls substances, or the like) or cases of relations (a Platonism that provides truthmakers needs cases of the instantiation relation) or the like. So it's not a trivial category. So, in fact, there is a fundamental ontological category that contains both properties and persons.
We can now further subdivide this ontological category in various ways. For instance, we may subdivide it into those members that can have instances and those that can't. (Were I a Platonist, I guess I'd be a sparse Platonist and I wouldn't think there can be properties that can't have instances.) Or we may subdivide it into those members that require time and those that don't. But I don't see much reason why persons couldn't cut across such subdivisions. Compare, for instance, the way that persons cuts across scientific categories: it's possible to have persons that are members of the kingdom of animalia and persons that are members of the kingdom of plantae (though in fact there aren't any) and persons that are members of completely alien taxa.
Here's an interesting little thought. If (a) functionalism is true, and (b) nothing whose existence is a function of a field (electromagnetic, etc.) having such-and-such values in such-and-such region is a substance, then (c) it is possible to have a person that isn't a substance. For, surely, it's possible to have a field whose internal self-interactions exhibit the kind of complexity that a developed functionalism takes to be definitive of personhood. And if so, then arguments against my thesis based on the idea that persons are substances will fail. However, I think this little argument about functionalism is, instead, a reason to reject functionalism.
ReplyDeleteHere's a really short entry. E9:
ReplyDeleteSun Jan 31 08:22:02 2010
Something along the following lines perhaps?
(1) Persons are a moral good in and of themselves
(2) But properties need to be instantiated to acquire any moral worth
(3) Therefore a property cannot be a person
E10 was a duplicate of E9.
ReplyDeleteEntry E11 (Sun Jan 31 09:42:50 2010):
1. All persons instantiate at least one property.
2. No property instantiates a property.
3. Therefore, no person is a property.
Premise 2 should be accepted by anyone who thinks that properties must contribute non-redundant causal powers:
2a. All properties contribute non-redundant causal powers.
2b. No property of a property contributes non-redundant causal powers.
In defense of 2b: any putative causal power contributed by the second-order property will already be contributed by the first-order property. (A red thing has causal powers in virtue of being red, and being colored contributes no powers that being red does not already contribute.)
Entry E12 (Sun Jan 31 11:06:22 2010):
ReplyDelete(1) If there exists a property that is (also) a person, then there exists a person p that is identical to the property P. (Premise)
(2) If there exists a person p that is identical to the property P, then p is identical to every property of p. (Premise)
(3) Every person must have the property of self-identity. (Premise)
(4) There exists a person p' that is not identical to the property P. (Premise)
(5) p' has the property of self-identity. (3,4)
(6) If there exists a property that is (also) a person, then p is identical to self-identity. (1-3)
(7) No person can have a person other than itself as a property. (Premise)
(8) There does not exist a property that is (also) a person. (5-7)
Not really an argument that would convince me, but one that puzzles me. (2) and (7) seem the ones that one could object to in order to reject (8), but I am not sure what one might find wrong with them. Think of it as a warm-up for more serious arguments.
In E11, I am worried about 2b. Granted, the first order property has already contributed powers to its instantiators. But maybe the first order property itself has powers which it gets from properties that it instantiated and which powers it does not, in turn, contribute to its instantiators.
ReplyDeleteIn E12, I agree that (7) and (2) (especially (2)) are what needs more work. But I think E12 is pretty powerful as it stands in the divine simplicity. For, plausibly, someone who says that God is divinity is apt to say that for all P, if P is a property of God, then God=P. And then self-identity is a problem. But I am only trying to defend one part of divine simplicity--the claim that God=divinity. If I were trying to defend the more general claim, I might take a sparse theory of properties and deny that self-identity is a property. Or I might take some strong theory of analogical predication, and deny that God and human beings both have the very same self-identity property. By the way, as a friendly amendment to E12, I suggest using personhood rather than self-identity. Those who object to merely formal properties may object to self-identity, but not to personhood--and every person has personhood. :-)
This has so far been the best way of gathering objections to a thesis that I've seen!
ReplyDeleteEntry E13 (Mon Feb 1 04:37:33 2010):
A short argument trying to use the idea that persons are conrete substances by arguing from one of the capabilities of a person, it would rule out any bundle theory of substances, but may allow for Platonic Forms being seen as substances.
P1. All persons have a point of view, that is, they can perceive things.
P2. No properties perceive things.
C. No person is a property.
Entry E14 (Mon Feb 1 10:37:42 2010):
ReplyDeleteThis entry is focused on whether God is a property or not, and so it might be disqualified from the running. However, you might find it an interesting argument, even so.
Suppose (for reductio): God is (i) a (platonic) property that is (ii) a person and (iii) is simple.
1. God is identical with any property that God has (given simplicity).
2. Thus, God is identical with the property of being Divine.
3. the property of being divine has the property of being abstract (all properties have this property by definition).
4. Thus, God has the property of being abstract (2,3, Leibniz's Law).
5. Thus, God is identical with the property of being abstract (1).
6. Greenness has the property of being abstract (premise).
7. Thus, Greenness has the property of being Divine (2,5,6)*
8. But Greenness is not divine.
9. Contradiction!
10. So, it is not the case that God is (i) a (platonic) property that is (ii) a person and (iii) is simple.
11. God is a person and is simple.
12. Thus, God is not a platonic property.
Entry E15 (Mon Feb 1 14:38:24 2010):
ReplyDeleteHi Alex,
So the conclusion of the argument is that no property is a person, i.e. if something is identical to a person, that thing ain't a property. I'm going to assume the 'is' here expresses the 'is' of numerical identity. So the claim is that there is no property, being a person, and individual person i, such that being a person = i.
P1. For any non-identity property F, possibly, there are distinct things that can jointly instantiate F (properties are shareable).
P2. Being a person is a non-identity property (contrast with being identical to Alex).
P3. So, possibly, there are distinct things 'c' and 'a' that have the property of being a person (and there are, for example, you and I have this property).
P4. For Reductio, suppose that, possibly, being a person = i, for some individual i.
P5. If, possibly, 'c' has the property of being a person and being a person = i, then 'c' has the property of possibly being identical to i.
P6. If, possibly, 'a' has the property of being a person and being a person = i, then 'a' has the property of possibly being identical to i.
P7. For any individuals x and y, if x and y are distinct, then x and y are necessarily distinct.
P8. If P6, then possibly there are distinct individuals x and y, that could have been identical to i.
P9. If P8, then P7 is false.
C. Thus, we must rejection our supposition that possibly, being a person = i, for some individual i.
Entry E16 (Mon Feb 1 16:38:46 2010):
ReplyDeleteNice contest! Hereby my proposed argument.
First Premise: A property is an abstract object,
Second Premise: A person is a concrete object,
Third Premise: No abstract object is a concrete object,
Conclusion: Therefore no property is a person.
Please note that the above proposed argument is not similar to the other submissions that I have seen on the contest webpage thus far, because:
- Concrete objects can be material (a table)
- Concrete objects can be immaterial (God or a human-mind)
- Concrete objects can be contingent (a table or a human-mind)
- Concrete objects can be necessary (God)
- Concrete objects can be located in time (a table)
- Concrete objects can be located at a single location (a table)
- Concrete objects can be located at multiple locations (my tableware)
- Concrete objects can be outside time and space (God before His creation)
- Concrete objects can be caused (a human-mind) or uncaused (God)
- Concrete objects can have causal powers (God or a human-mind performing an act of free will or a stone rolling of a mountain and hitting another stone)
- Abstract objects are always immaterial
- Abstract objects can be contingent (the earth's equator or the color white)
- Abstract objects can be necessary (the number one)
- Abstract objects can be located in time (the earth's equator)
- Abstract objects can be located at a single location (the earth's equator)
- Abstract objects can be located at multiple locations (the color white)
- Abstract objects can be outside time and space (the number two)
- Abstract objects can be caused (the color white) or uncaused (the number two)
- Abstract objects can have causal powers (a logical law that implies other logical laws)
Note: The author of E14 emailed his/her submission to me, saying he/she had difficulties posting it with the form. I tried to post it myself with the form, and oddly enough it didn't work with Internet Explorer but worked with Firefox. Maybe IE has a limit on the length of text that can be submitted with a GET request? (Anybody know?)
ReplyDeleteSwitched from GET to post. Seems to work with IE now.
ReplyDeleteSuppose that the folks who think that singular propositions include as parts the individuals they are about. Then what seemed to be a paradigm of an abstract entity--a proposition--can contain a person as a part. If that kind of a view can be defended, then I think the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is blurred.
ReplyDeleteHere's another positive view. Suppose we agree with Adams that Socrateity cannot exist without Socrates, but insist that if Socrates exists, so does Socrateity. As it stands, this view is subject to the following objection. On a standard version of this view, Socrates and Socrateity are distinct contingent beings, but with the property that, necessarily, one exists iff the other does. I think such necessary connections between contingent beings always call for an explanation--we don't want this just to be a coincidence. We don't want to say that Socrateity explanatorily depends on Socrates, because a Socrates who isn't already assumed to have Socrateity can't explain anything. But neither do want to say that Socrates explanatorily depends on Socrateity, because then we really have undercut our grounds for thinking Socrateity requires Socrates. Now maybe there is some other way of explaining the correlation. But here is a neat and simple solution: Socrates=Socrateity. If so, then every person is a property.
My first sentence left out at its end "are right".
ReplyDeleteI'm short of time for commenting. So I am just posting.
ReplyDeleteEntry E17 (Tue Feb 2 09:55:48 2010):
I am not sure that this question is one that can be solved. As I see it, one will necessarily arrive at a negative conclusion if she takes "property" in a conceptual sense, meaning that whatever is seen as diverse conceptually is also diverse insofar as it is a property. For given this understanding, one will realize that within the concept "person" are the more fundamental concepts of "rational" and "volitional." And if there are multiple concepts, then there must be multiple properties, making it impossible for there to be a person who is identical to a property. However, if one wishes to affirm that a person can be identical to a property, then all he needs to do is deny that each concept is a property. But then he will need to give a non-question-begging account of why some simple concepts are able to be taken as properties (e.g., redness) whereas others are not. I myself am not sure that this can be done with respect to this question, but that is not my problem, it will be yours!
Entry E18 (Tue Feb 2 17:26:15 2010):
ReplyDeleteE14 here again (note: you say in a comment that I emailed you my previous submission, but I didn't. I think you might be confusing me, E14, with someone else.)
Here's an argument which shows that there is no thing that is a property, a person, and simple.
1. Suppose there is something, P, such that P is (i) simple, (ii) a property, and (iii) a person.
2. For any property, Q, it has the property of being abstract (premise).
3. P has the property of being abstract (2, 1(ii)).
4. P is identical with the property of being abstract (3, 1(i))
5. All properties instantiate P (2,4)
6. P has the property of instantiating P (5; also derivable from 3,4).
7. P has the property of instantiating-itself (6). [note: not the property of instantiating-P, but the property of being-self-instantiating]
8. P is identical with the property of instantiating-itself (7, 1(i)).
9. The property of instantiating-itself is identical with the property of being abstract (8,4, transitivity of identity).
10. All properties instantiate themselves (2, 9; also derivable from 5,8).
11. But it is false that all properties instantiate themselves.
12. Contradiction!
13. So it is not the case that there is something, P, such that P is (i) simple, (ii) a property, and (iii) a person.
Entry E19 (Tue Feb 2 19:59:05 2010):
ReplyDeleteI haven’t read all the entries, so I hope I am not repeating anyone.
I take properties necessarily to be ways things are/exist [following Abelard].
Also, I take it you are only concerned with whether God could be a property, so this is what I will focus on.
(1) x is a way of being (i.e., property) if and only if there exists something y such that y exists x-ly.
(2) Suppose property, P, is a person, and P exists.
(3) Then, there must exist some thing y which exists P-ly. [from 1,2].
(4) If there were nothing y such that y existed P-ly, then P would not exist. [from 1,2,3].
(5) Properties ultimately depend for their existence upon things other than properties (i.e., substances).**
(6) Suppose, God is a person and God is identical to the property Divinity.
(7)So, God is a property (call this property G). [from 6]
(8) G depends for its existence upon something other than properties.
(9) But (8) would entail that G depends for its existence upon something other than God. [from 5,6].
(10) This would lead to a contradiction concerning the nature of God.
(11) Therefore, God is not a property.
** - I think there is a lot that can be said distinguishing properties from substances, and furthermore I think unless you want a bundle theory of particulars, (5) is at least very plausible.
Entry E20 (Wed Feb 3 09:15:51 2010):
ReplyDeleteA handwaving argument against the thesis that at least one property is a person. It will be sufficient to show that no person is a property.
First, no contingent person is a property. All properties are necessary beings, no contingent person is a necessary being, so no contingent person is a property. It is now sufficient to show that no necessarily existing person is a property.
The only reasonable candidates for necessarily existing persons are deities of some sort. Plausibly, if some necessarily existing deity exists, then the religious tradition in which that deity figures is likely to be mostly true. Furthermore, if a necessarily existing deity exists and is identical to a property, it is likely that this fact would be included in, or deducible from, the religious tradition in which that deity figures. Consequently, it will be sufficient to show that no necessarily existing personal deity, the religious tradition surrounding which includes the claim that said deity is identical to a property, is in fact identical to a property. And to show this, it will be sufficient to show that the claim that the personal deity is identical to a property is inconsistent or unlikely given other, more central aspects of that tradition.
The only deity whose religious tradition includes the claim that the deity is identical to a property is a certain speculative strand of Christianity. So it will be sufficient to show that the view that some divine person is a property is inconsistent or unlikely given some central aspect of the Christian tradition.
One very central aspect of the Christian tradition is the Trinity. The Christian God is not one person, but three persons, in one substance. So if some divine person is identical to a property, we would have to ask which divine person that is.
It is not the case that all the divine persons are identical to the same property. Then the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are all identical to the property, say, of divinity, and thus identical to each other. This is modalism, which has been declared a heresy, and if any of these persons exist then it is most likely that modalism is false.
Could it be the case that only one divine person is identical to a property? There are many options to consider, but (in hand-waving fashion) note that the Son and the Spirit are in different ways “derivative” from the Father (by generation and procession, respectively). It would be peculiar if, say, the Son was identical to the property of divinity. Then the Father, who is divine, would be an instance of the Son. So the more reasonable scenario, supposing that one divine person is identical to a property, would be that it is the Father.
Suppose for hand-waving reductio that the Father is identical to all the various essential properties of the Godhead. Then at least one of the following arguments, or their cumulative force, is compelling:
ReplyDelete• On this assumption, the Son and the Spirit are instances of the Father. But they are not.
• On this assumption, the relations of generation and procession are species of instantiation. But they are not.
• On this assumption, there is no good way to distinguish the two derivative persons of the Godhead; nothing individuates them. But something does.
• On this assumption, the unity of the Trinity is compromised, in that the Father is ontologically distinct from the other two persons (he being a property, they not). Alternatively, the Father has an essential property, “being a property”, that the other two persons lack, and this compromises the unity of the Trinity. But that unity is not compromised.
• On this assumption, the Father has the essential property of “being a property”. Since the Father is simple, the Father is identical to this property also. Then he has another essential property, namely, “being the property of being a property.” (a) This can be carried on ad infinitum, which is absurd. (b) If the Father is identical to the property of being a property, then everything that is a property instantiates the Father. But many properties (being a wrench, being blue, being a goldfish) do not instantiate the Father. This is super-absurd. (c) It will also follow that the Father instantiates himself, which is triple-dog absurd.
• In the Christian Tradition, it is God, the whole Trinity, who is supposed to be simple. But this view has it that only the Father is simple. So this view is not a defense of divine simplicity, which was the original point.
Quod erat hand-wavingly demonstratum.
I think the trinitarian considerations in E20 are important and challenging. The following claim, I think, may be false: "The only deity whose religious tradition includes the claim that the deity is identical to a property is a certain speculative strand of Christianity." Maimonedes says that Jews should affirm the identity between God and his attributes, and that if we deny the identity between God and his attributes, we're no better than the trinitarians! (Presumably his thought is this: Denial of the identity between God and his attributes is contrary to monotheism just as much as trinitarianism is. This may well be a jab at certain Islamic philosophers--Islam eventually came to deny that identity.)
ReplyDeleteOn the trinitarian issues, I think "person" has two meanings. One is the more technical and specific meaning in trinitarian discussion. The other is a more hand-wavy meaning of a being that has intelligence, agency, consciousness, etc. And the Trinity in THIS sense is a person.
Entry E21 (Wed Feb 3 10:49:19 2010):
ReplyDeleteMy entry will probably seem too simple to most. But I want to raise both a criticism to some of the approaches put forward so far, and a solution that I think avoids the criticism.
Most of the proposals so far have be attempts of the following form:
I) Suggest an (essential) feature of property, and argue that persons do not have this feature, or
II) Suggest an (essential) feature of a person, and argue that properties do not have this feature.
This is an oversimplification, granted. Even so, these are initially good ways to go... but there are two problems:
1) In suggesting the essential feature in question, we are invoking other theories, theories which the proponent of the "property as person" can deny. For example, 'a property must be something that can be instantiated in such-and-such a way', or 'properties can be repeatble'. But the proponent here can always just deny the theory that claims this as a feature of properties (or persons).
2) Even more problematic is the following: why can't something just be a property and a person /in addition/? Call this the conjunctive view, if you want to give it a name. Surely not all properties are persons; but some might be. Those properties just happen to have additional features, features that are sufficient for personhood. Take the previous example of green being a person. Green could have all of the features of a property, but in addition, have the features of persons (concreteness, etc.). So green, on this example, could be a property, but it could also turn out that green has a mind, for example. For the conjunctive view to fail, there would have to be a non-question begging reason why no property could have any of the essential features of a person. I say non-question begging because of (1) above: the proponent can always switch to a theory of properties that allows for the essential features of a person.
I'm not sure how to get around this. But here's an argument that takes on board only eminent realism about properties:
1) For any property P, there exists at least one object x and time t such that x does not instantiate/have/exemplify/whatever P at time t.
2) There is a possible world w with only one object, x, that exists for only time t.
3) There is a possible world where P is not instantiated/had/exemplified. (1&2)
4) If P is not instantiated/had/exemplified at a world w, it does not exist at world w (emiment realism).
5) P does not exist at world w.
6) A necessary being B exists in all possible worlds. (def.)
7) B exists at world w. (from 5)
8) B is not identical to P, since B exists at world w and P does not.
So, (1) and (2) are obviously the weak links here. But (1), I think, is plausible. If (1) were false, there would be a property that all objects had at all times. So no objects would differ in terms of their P-ness. There some epistemic problems with this. Furthermore, even if (1) is false, I doubt that the theist would want "divinity" as one of these properties-- i.e., they would deny that all objects have divinity all the time.
As for (2): It is not incoherent to think of a world that had a single object that did not instantiate some property. Of course, the response would be that, since there is a necessary being, a world with just one thing would have to be that being. But then we face a dilemma. Either that sole necessary being at w instantiates/has/exemplifies P, or it does not. If it does not, then there is still a world where P does not exist, and so B is not identical to P. If it does, then on the theory that B=P, P instantiates/has/exemplifies itself, which just seems incoherent.
I still feel that this doesn't work, and I'm not as good a metaphysician as the other folks on here. But thanks for letting me try!
My, the entries are getting complicated! By the way, I had to break E20 between two comments to post it. Thanks everybody for your time, and these really interesting arguments.
ReplyDeleteQuick correction to E21 (my own suggestion)...
ReplyDeleteThe view of properties should be, of course, "Immanent Realism", not "Eminent". I wish I could blame this on computer error, but really it was a combination of little sleep and sloppy proofreading.
Sorry if this caused confusion.
In E21, won't the theist just simply reject (1)?
ReplyDeleteIt wouldn't be a property that _all_ objects had at all times, but that ONE object had at all times.
If God has/is a property and immutable, then God's properties are necessary and exist when he does. Now, God is a necessary being, so there will be no time nor possible world where God does not exist, and hence God's properties will omni-temporally/worldly be instantiated.
@Andrew,
ReplyDeleteIf that is the case, there is a possible world w that just has God and God's properties only. Then we have the dilemma mentioned in response to (2). If P does not exist in w, but God does, then God is not identical to P. If P does exist in w, then God's being indentical to P means that P instantiates/has itself.
The only way out of the dilemma for the theist that I can see is to argue that a property can instantiate itself. So maybe IS A PROPERTY is a property, and so would instantiate itself. That is just an example, of course-- the theist would need to show that divinity, or whatever the suggested property is, is also one of these self-instantiating properties. (Honestly, though, I don't understand the idea of such properties).
Ahhh...ok. Sorry, I was too quick to reply, I see now. Kinda nifty!
ReplyDeleteIt looks like what is driving this argument is the idea that properties are ontologically dependent (i.e., non self instantiating). So, it looks like the dilemma for the theist can also be put as follows (I think):
Either (a) properties are ontologically independent (i.e., self-instantiating - this would seem to make God a trope), or (b) God is not identical to His properties.
I don't think (b) is the way to go (that would be to 'give up' the fight), so why not say God is a trope? Tropes are self-instantiating (right?). Does this seem plausible?
Maybe a problem with self-instantiation is that a thing depends on its properties--at least some of its essential properties?
ReplyDeleteEntry E22 (Thu Feb 4 11:46:21 2010):
ReplyDelete1. Suppose God (the interesting case) is identical to a property, e.g. divinity. (assumption for reductio)
2. God instantiates the property of divinity. (premise)
3. God instantiates himself. (from 1, 2)
4. If God is identical to one essential property, he is identical to all his essential properties. (premise)
5. God is identical to all his essential properties. (1,4)
6. One essential property God has is “being (identical to) a property”. (from 1,5, necessity of identity)
7. God is identical to the property of being a property. (from 5,6)
8. All properties whatsoever instantiate God. (from 7)
9. The property of divinity is identical to the property of being a property. (from 1,7,transitivity of identity)
10. All properties are divine. (from 9)
11. All properties are omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, eternal, etc. (similar reasoning as for 10)
I claim that conclusions 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are false, and show that 1 ought to be rejected.
I think the best reply is to accept 3 and argue that there is something fishy going on in 6, from which the other allegedly false conclusions follow. What is fishy about it I could not say, exactly. Alternatively, you could make something of the metaphysics of participation in Being out of 8 and what follows.
Entry E23 (Mon Feb 8 05:40:59 2010):
ReplyDeleteEvery person is a substance, therefore persons must obey the principles of substance constitution, which can be assumed to apply to all substances in the same way.
Premise 2 rules out accounts of substance constitution that are nominalist about properties, i.e., reduce the latter to similarity classes of objects (resemblance nominalism).
Hence, we are left with 1) the bundle theory, with either universals or tropes, (BT) and 2) the bare particular (substratum) theory (BPT).
It follows that the thesis: There exists a property which is (also) a person is either trivial or false.
Assume BT: on this account there are only properties, and substances just are collections of properties. Then, *every* substance is a property: the property which is the conjunction of all the substance’s (essential) properties. This makes the thesis trivial.
Assume BPT. On this account, either substances are bare particulars plus at least some properties (essential to the substance) - thick particulars -, or they are bare particulars and nothing else, even if they necessarily exemplify certain properties - thin particulars -. In the first case, again *every* substance is (*also!*) a property, for it is the bare particular plus the conjunction of all the (essential) properties that make it thick. The thesis is trivial. In the second case, since every substance is a thin particular, *no* substance is also a property, for properties are what gets ‘attached’ to thin particulars. The thesis is false.
One may reject the triviality charge by claiming that there are no conjunctive properties, and so no substance is also a property unless it only has one essential property. However, given that conjunctive properties really are an ontological free lunch given their conjunct properties, it seems hard to reject them; especially, so, if meanwhile one assumes that there is at least one special property which is simple, genuine, and exhausts a substance’s content (if the thesis requires the property to be exactly one person, then one should additionally assume trope theory or a universal with necessarily only one instance). This claim appears at least as 'heavy' as the claim that conjunctive properties are genuine properties. Besides, I suspect properties such as divinity (e.g., being God) should be regarded as analyzable in terms of other properties.
Against the claim that the thesis is false if substances are thin particulars, one may claim that properties too are thin particulars (i.e., substances) of sorts. However, it seems to me that this would dissolve the categorial difference that is crucial in BPT.
A few remarks on this really neat argument.
ReplyDeleteI don't deeply mind the thesis being trivial (as, for instance, it is on the suggestion that every individual is its own haecceity).
On a class-based nominalist view, it is not clear that the thesis is false. Why couldn't Fred, in addition to being a particular, also be a class? For instance, one can have a set theory on which every particular is a self-membered ur-element (well-foundedness fails, then). In that case, the thesis is trivial and hence true. Or one can suppose that some particulars are sets, but not self-membered. All this seems perfectly coherent. For instance, if two individuals cannot have the same simple parts (so, co-locationism is necessarily false), then each non-simple individual could count as and be (for maybe all there is to some plurality being sets is their standing in the right structural relations) the set of all its simple parts.
On the BPT horn: I don't see how the thesis is trivial on the thick particular version. The typical individual is a particular-plus-property, and a particular-plus-property isn't a property.
On the thin side, if BPT makes too much of the categorial difference between properties and particulars, then it fails as an account of predication. We ascribe properties not only to particulars but also to properties (e.g., not being a color is had by me, Seabiscuit and wisdom). If we go nominalist at the level of properties, then we might as well go nominalist at the level of particulars, and our story will be neater.
"*no* substance is also a property, for properties are what gets ‘attached’ to thin particulars": This seems to be the crux (on the thin BPT view). But it doesn't seem to be a valid sub-argument.
1. Fs are what gets "attached" to Gs.
2. Therefore, no G is an F.
Compare:
1'. Accessories are what gets "attached" to accessorizables.
2'. Therefore, no accessorizable is an accessory.
1' is true, but 2' is false: a printer is an accessory to a computer, but one can accessorize a printer by adding more memory.
Four quick remarks (do I have to submit them through the form in order to strengthen the case in favour of my entry? ;) )
ReplyDelete1) Of course what you call class-based nominalism is ruled out by your premise 1 (this is mentioned in the entry). In any case, I don't really get the point there...
2) On the BPT horn, the thesis is trivial when a substance is a particular-plus-property because this suffices for satisfying the '(also)' qualification that you added to the thesis that is to be argued against (this is also pointed out in the entry). If you remove the '(also)', then on both BPT accounts the thesis is false.
3) On the thin side, BPT is not an account of predication, it is *essentially* an account of substance constitution. Hence, the BPT theorist can insist on the substratum/property dualism without worrying about predication for properties (assuming that s/he can't amounts to simply assuming that properties ARE substances).
4) Clearly, the claim that properties get attached is made on the assumption that substances are thin, completely bare, particulars. Again, *given thise key assumption of the theory being considered*, that a property has or can have properties doesn't make it a substance.
Thanks! These remarks help.
ReplyDeleteAd 2: I did not intend the "also" to change the meaning of the "is". If a cat is a soul-plus-body, it is not correct to say that a cat is also a soul--the soul is a part or constituent of the cat, or the cat has a soul, but the cat is not the soul.
Ad 3: This is a good point. I was thinking of properties as theoretical entities brought in to explain certain phenomena, of which the main one is predication. However, I should think of looking at them as brought in to explain substance constitution.
Ad 4: So why can't a property be a thin, completely bare, almost-particular? An almost-particular is something that satisfies every requirement for being a particular, and has the same kind of constitution that a particular does, with the one exception that we do not specify that nothing can instantiate it.
Hi! Quick reply:
ReplyDelete2: Ok, so rephrased, your thesis is false on the BPT account, because given the substratum/property duality no property can be a substance.
4: Even granting your concept of a quasi-particular that can be instantiated, the fact remains that on the 'thin' BPT account a bare particular is a support for properties *which doesn't have any qualitative content in itself* (this is what its bareness consists of). This clearly doesn't hold for properties. And of course, if you insist that a substance need not be identified with a *bare* particular, then you endorse the 'thick' BPT account; according to the latter, however, properties are what provides the thickness, and so cannot be identified with the thick particulars themselves.
So, there have been a few arguments given that argue properties depend upon their subject for their existence (properties depend upon substances). And therefore, since God does not depend on anything God cannot be a property.
ReplyDeleteIt seems these arguments have some weight, but the Catholic is already willing to acknowledge properties existing without depending upon their substance (a substance). What I have in mind is the Eucharist. Aquinas in his commentary on Peter Lombard's De Sententiae states this (book IV). So, perhaps it isn't as troublesome for Catholics for properties to exist without a substance. Then again it may be all the worse, regardless, it seems worth noting.
I'm the author of E21; I wanted to respond to Andrews two posts.
ReplyDeleteSo my argument and a few others do seem to hinge on properties being dependent on substances for their existence. (Note, also, that a trope theory does not automatically deny this-- one can have a trope/substance ontology-- one must specifically have a bundle trope theory).
So let's suppose that properties do not depend on a substance for their existence (maybe there just are bundles of tropes). If that is the case, one needs some way of distinguishing maximally similiar tropes. Instantiation by an object won't do, obviously.
One of the only ways I can see of doing this is by something like spatial/temporal location. So let's ask this: if there is a divinity trope (which is a person), where is it located?
I see three options. Option one is to find a location that is a part of the world. But this will be little comfort to the theist, since this would entail that God is not omnipresent.
Option two is to say that the trope somehow exists outside of space-time. But this would be contra to the immanent realism, which would create its own problems.
Option three would be to say that the trope exists in space-time, but not a part-- it exists in all space-time. But then, I'm not sure how it is seperate from a "universe trope", if you will. Indeed, I'm not sure how we would be able to distinguish it at all.
Of course, these are not definitive arguments-- but each branch requires certain defenses, and I fear that the cure might be worse than the illness. So, which rabbit hole do we go down?
Hi, author of E23 here.
ReplyDeleteI am not sure I see why tropes need to be distinguished by some external factor (when maximally similar). Don't they possess (or, isn't it possible to claim that they possess) primitive identities?
About the three options suggested in the previous post:
Opt. i) How about 'everywhere'?
Opt. ii)How about restricting immanent realism to things created by God?
Opt. iii) How about identifying God and the 'universe trope'?
(Of course it all depends on one's conception of God, but it doesn't look like there is any reason for ruling out all these options at the same time).
The real worry, I guess, is that conceding that properties can be independent from substances
a) concedes too much;
b) still falls short of proving that some properties can be persons (i.e., substances).
As I claim in my argument, this is true on bundle theories if one identifies substances with conjunctive properties, but in a trivial manner (Alexander says otherwise, but I still suspect such triviality makes his initial question way less interesting than he wanted it to be).
@Author of E23 (from author of E21):
ReplyDelete"Opt. i) How about 'everywhere'?"
That is, in fact, option 3, so I'm not sure what your criticism is...
"Opt. ii)How about restricting immanent realism to things created by God?"
That's fine, but then one owes two explanations: 1) the version of realism for properties that lets God be real w/o IR, and 2) why we restrict IR just to created things.
"Opt. iii) How about identifying God and the 'universe trope'?"
That's fine too (though perhaps epistemically messy). But then, on this branch, one would have to claim either that God was the universe, or was part of the universe. I'm not sure if those are results a theist would want (though perhaps I'm wrong).
I'm also wondering about your (b) in the last post. Sure, that properties can be independent of substances *alone* does not prove that properties can be persons-- but I don't think any of the proposals here are doing that. Furthermore, the "can" in this statement is important. All that needs to be done is to show that it is not impossible for a property to be a person (and, hopefully, in a way that applies to the original debate). Conceding that properties are independent from substances need only allow the possibility, so I'm not sure how this claim "falls short".
BTW, how are you using 'substance' here? The way I use it, a substance cannot be just a conjunctive property. But, on other definitions, I'm not sure why a person would have to be substance...
From E23:
ReplyDeleteOf course my opt. i) is the same as your (E21's) opt. iii) I was just taking the points in turn, no criticism there. Re. opt. ii) it seems to me that the fundamental distinction by a creating God and the created universe provides a natural way to 'restrict IR to created things': it is God him/herself that creates the possibility of existing in rebus, hence s/he cannot be already real in the sense of IR. On the other hand, (opt. iii)) identifying God and the universe trope makes sense of IR (and of God's omnipresence), so it looks like if one likes IR one should have no problems there.
As for b), of course none of the arguments provided here purported to show that the independence of properties from substances suffices to 'prove that properties can be persons', if only because the challenge was to argue that properties CANNOT be persons. Still, Andrew's last post seemed to suggest that dropping the dependence of properties might make it possible to claim that a property can be a person. Surely he only made a claim of possibility, but it is still the case that a) this would be an ad hoc assumption regarding God and b) the challenge remains basically untouched. This has nothing to do with whether he used 'can' or 'must'.
In particular, as I suggest in my argument, it is important to clarify whether one only has properties or also other categories (e.g., bare particulars) in one's ontology. In the latter case, the property/substance identification doesn't go through even if properties are independent; in the former, it would seem (contra your use of 'substance') that since there are only properties, a substance is a bundle of properties and the 'identifier' sympathetic to Alexander's project *may* construct substances as conjunctions of bundled properties. As I said, this allows for *A* property to be a person, but holds trivially for all substances given the bundle theory. I agree that this may not be a plausible conception of a substance (although it is not absurd given the bundle theory), but the alternative (I argue) is the falsity of Alexander's thesis, Q.E.D.
Entry E24 (Fri Feb 19 18:33:00 2010):
ReplyDelete1. Necessarily, for all persons x, x is embodied, or owns a body m, wherein the properties of m instantiate x, properties of x or the properties that constitute x. (Embodiment premise)
2. Necessarily, for all bodies b, b has more than one property. (Bodies have more than one property premise)
3. Necessarily if m has a property p, then x also has that property. (A Supervenience thesis that suggests a person’s properties supervenes on bodily properties)
4. So, if x has a property or is constituted of properties, x has more than one property or is constituted of more than one property.
5. But if 4, then it is not the case that a single property constitutes a person, or a person has a single property.
6. Thus, it is not the case that there exists a single property which is a person.
(1) is fairly straight forward, most persons are embodied. This seems to be a major assumption in most ethical work about persons. Bodies and their properties are morally relevant, we are not disembodied agents, and if we were we would not be persons.
(2) is a little less straight forward, but this premise seems to be true and aids us in identifying different persons. I and steve have different bodily properties which aids in identifying different persons.
(3) seems true and there is some linguistic evidence to suggest it is true. Suppose I have blue eyes, this is a bodily property. But it seems also true that I, Ray, have blue eyes.
(4) follows from 1, 2, and 3.
(6) follows from (4) and (5)
Entry E25 (Sat Feb 20 21:38:07 2010):
ReplyDelete(This is a variant of the third argument you gave in your 31 comment blogpost. Hopefully- for my sake- it is a more toxic variant)
1.) Anything that is a basis for objective classification is a property (Alexander Pruss's Blog July 20, 2009)
2.) If some person can be a property, some person can be the objective basis of classification.
3.) Let "some person" be named by her personal name, Shirley. Then the name Shirley can be the name of a classification.
4.) But Shirley, as it names an individual person, cannot be the name of a classification (to be proven).
5.) Therefore no person can be a property
Proof for 4.)
4a.) The name of a classification is said of many univocally (assumption to be proved)
4b.) The name Shirley, as it names an individual person, cannot be said of many univocally (self-evident, for it names an individual).
Proof for 4a.
4c.) Let it be assumed that a classification, as such, need not be said of many, at least potentially (assumption for reductio)
4d.) If a classification need not said of many univocally, at least potentially, those that are said of many differ from those that are not by some difference, D.
4e.) So then D and ~D, which make species of classification, are said of some classification.
4f.) So then classification as such is said of a classification, which is absurd for several reasons:
It would make a genus logically co-extensive with its species.
D or ~D make no restriction in a genus- the difference would not make a difference.
Very concept of a classification would be infinite and circular, and a complete account of a classification would be impossible, even in principle: "A classification is a kind of classification is a kind of classification is a kind of..."
Entry E26 (Tue Feb 23 11:21:37 2010):
ReplyDeleteFor every argument submitted, let the conjunction of the premises of that argument be a disjunct of the one premise of the master argument. Include the following disjunct:
1. There exists a property which is (also) a person, P. (reductio hypothesis)
2. If (1), then P = divinity and P is simple. (premise: assumption of divine
simplicity)
3. Therefore, P = divinity and P is simple. (1,2)
4. I have the property of being a person, call it Q. (premise: given realism)
5. Either P has Q xor P lacks Q. (premise)
6. If P has Q, then Q is an essential property of P. (premise)
7. If P = divinity and P is simple, then P is identical to all its essential
properties. (premise: support below)
7a. If (3), then possibly, P doesn't create anything.
(premise: doctrine of divine freedom)
7b. If (3), then were P not to create anything, P would be the only entity
that exists. (premise: divine simplicity doctrine of absolute creation)
7c. Therefore, if (3), then possibly, P is the only entity that exists.
(7a, 7b)
7d. If any essential property of P is not identical to P, then ~ (7c).
(necessity of identity)
7e. Therefore, If (3), then P is identical to all its essential properties.
(7c, 7d)
8. Therefore, if P has Q, then P = Q. (6, 7)
9. Therefore, if P has Q, then I am divine (have divinity). (4, 8)
10. Whatever is divine is eternal. (premise)
11. I am not eternal. (premise)
12. Therefore, I am not divine. (10-11)
13. Therefore, it's not the case that P has Q. (9, 12) [notice: this means
that P, though a person, is not a person in the same sense I am.]
14. If P lacks Q, then it is necessary that P lacks Q. (5, 6, the assumption
that P is necessarily existent)
15. Necessarily, if P lacks Q, then Q is lacked by P. (premise)
16. Necessarily, if Q is lacked by P, then Q exists.
(premise: serious actualism)
17. Therefore, if P lacks Q, then it is necessary that Q exists.
(14 - 16, distribution axiom)
18. Therefore, if P lacks Q, then possibly, Q = P. (3, 7c, 17)
19. Therefore, if P lacks Q, then Q = P. (necessity of identity)
20. Therefore, if P lacks Q, then P lacks divinity. (3, 19: Q = P = divinity)
21. It's not the case that P lacks divinity. (premise: whatever lacks
divinity is not divine, but P is divine [per starting assumption])
22. Therefore, it's not the case that P lacks Q. (20, 21)
23. Therefore, there is a contradiction. (5, 13, 22)
Therefore: the starting hypothesis, (1), is not true. Q.E.D.
I think E26 is pretty convincing, given the assumptions of divine simplicity, etc. It doesn't bother me because of the special dialectical context in which I want to do what I want to do. I suppose one way way to try to get out of it is to say that all positive properties apply to God analogically. Thus, I am a person by virtue of having personhood; however, God is a person not by virtue of having personhood, but by virtue of having divinity. This is weird, but I think not indefensible.
ReplyDeleteIn E24, I deny (1) and (3). One reason to deny (1) is the coherence of theism. :-) On the other hand, (3) implausibly entails that persons are bodies: just let p be the property of being a body.
As for E25, I am tempted to say that no name of a classification is said of many univocally. This in turn lets me deny 4d.
ReplyDeleteNames of classifications seem to me be words like: "greenness", "mammality", "humanity". But these things are not said of many univocally. "Greenness" is said of only one entity--the classification or property greenness. Grass is green, but grass isn't greenness.
But maybe "n is said of x" does not mean that "x is n" is true. Maybe "n is said of x" means that "x has n" is true. We do want to say that "greenness" is said of many in this sense--many things "have greenness". But if that's how we read "said of", with "has" instead of "is", then 4b is to be denied. 4b is supposed to follow from a general thesis about person's names. But that general thesis is false on this reading. For instance "Alexander" is not said of anybody--it is not said of me, since "Alexander has Alexander" is false, as I am not a property.
OK, maybe I'm wrong about what the names of classifications are. Maybe they're things like "green", "mammal" and "human". I guess then the argument works. In that case, the names of classifications are said non-univocally (analogously, I suppose) of the classification and of the things that fall under the classification. So now we have two ways of saying the name of a classification of something. Type I: "(the classification) green is (the classification) green" (this is identity; it sounds better in Greek than in English), and type II: "grass is green" (this is predication). In 4b, we then distinguish. The name "Shirley" cannot be said (type I) of many univocally, but only of Shirley, just as green cannot be said (type I) of many univocally, but only of the classification green. But the name "Shirley" can be said (type II) of many, just as green can.
By the way, an odd thing is that nobody has yet given references to the literature for the claim that no person (or maybe more generally no substance) is a property. Is there nothing much in the literature?
ReplyDeleteAlex,
ReplyDeleteI don't believe one can escape E26 merely by supposing that all positive properties apply to God analogically. If all properties apply to God analogically, then P lacks Q (if you accept (5)). But given (14)-(22), P doesn't lack Q.
A way to get out of the argument is to say that P neither has Q nor lacks Q. But that seems to be a very hard way out.
Hi from E23.
ReplyDeleteDoes E26 assume that God creates his/her own being a person (premise 7))? If so, is this convincing?
Couldn't premise 14) be countered by saying the P lacks Q but could have Q as an accidental property?
Why believe, as in premise 16), that if P lacks Q then Q exists? Doesn't it make sense to think that P lacks Q because Q doesn't exist? Incidentally, this seems to be what the author thinks would be the case if P decided not to create anything, (again premise 7)), so there appears to be a tension between premises 7) and 16).
Does E26 assume that God creates his/her own being a person (premise 7))? No--the argument for it merely supposes that P creates everything "outside" itself.
ReplyDeleteCouldn't premise 14) be countered by saying the P lacks Q but could have Q as an accidental property? Well, that premise actually follows from (5) and (6) together with the assumption that P is a necessary being. The vulnerable premise (I think) might be (6)--that if P has Q, then it essentially has Q. I think it's pretty plausible that if something is a person, it is essentially a person (I think this is especially plausible for a divine person); thus, I think it's pretty plausible that if something is a person by virtue of having the property of being a person, it essentially has that property.
Why believe, as in premise 16), that if P lacks Q then Q exists? Premise (16) says that (necessarily) if Q is lacked by P, then Q exists. The reason is serious actualism: it's not possible for Q to be anything, let alone lacked by P, if Q doesn't exist. If one were to state (16) in quantificational logic, then I think we'd see that it also falls out of Quinean meta-ontology...
Doesn't it make sense to think that P lacks Q because Q doesn't exist? My shoe lacks being a person, but that doesn't mean that there's no such property!
Sorry, let me be clearer, these answers are way too quick (thanks for them, anyway!):
ReplyDelete1) The argument says that if God doesn't create anything, then either his essential properties exist and are identical to God or they don't exist. This MEANS to assume that God creates his/her own essential properties.
2) From 5) and 6) it only follows that if P lacks Q then Q is not an essential property of P. (Indeed, it is not absurd to think that God can decide to stop being a person). (The fact that God necessarily exists seems to play no role here).
3) My point re. 16) was exactly about actualism: I lack the property of being a square circle, should I believe that this makes the property of being a square circle exist?
4) The shoe counterexample: of course! I didn't say 'P lacks Q *iff* Q doesn't exist'.
Dear Anonymous,
ReplyDeleteThanks for those further clarifications; I apologize for being too quick.
re: 1) I'm not sure I understand your reasoning there. Perhaps you could elaborate.
re: 2) Thanks for pressing this. I think E26 meant for (5) to include a necessity operator: necessarily, p has q xor p lacks q. Thanks for bringing that to light. If (5) is stated as I just did, then here's how I think (14) follows from (5) and (6) + P existing necessarily:
(14) says that if p lacks q then it is necessary that p lacks q. Suppose p lacks q, but there's a world w in which p exists and p doesn't lack q. In w, p has q (from 5). Thus, in w, p essentially has q (from 6): in other words, it has q in every world in which it exists. Thus, p has q in our world. Thus, p doesn't lack q in our world (from 5), which contradicts the starting assumption. Thus, if p lacks q, there's no world in which p exists but lacks q. p exists in every world; therefore, if p lacks q, then it is necessary that p lacks q.
As for God deciding to stop being a person, someone might try that way out. However, notice that the same argument structure can be used for ANY property I have--including being a substance or having abilities (if there are such properties). Could God decide to have no abilities or to cease being a substance?
re: 3) Oh, I see now what you were saying: sorry i was too quick before. :)
My sense is that if one rejects the existence of properties that cannot be exemplified, (I wonder why one might reject those sorts of things but not reject propositions that can't be true...), one shouldn't say that such properties are lacked by me. Rather, one should say that I'm not a square circle (say) by virtue of it being false that both I have being a square and I have being a circle. Does that seem right?
...one might of course suggest that if p doesn't have q, it doesn't thereby lack q; rather it's just false that p has q. In this way, one might reject (5) by saying that p neither has q nor lacks q. I personally think that's the best way out, but I don't think it's an easy way out.
ReplyDeleteThanks for the reply! One last (on the part of E23, at least) rejoinder:
ReplyDeleteYou're now saying that if P has Q in some world, then P has it necessarily. But again this assumes that P cannot have accidental properties. Perhaps God cannot rid himself of his/her essential properties, but certainly s/he can 'delete' his/her accidental ones; and that Q is essential has yet to be demonstrated! (In a word, I doubt 6): having Q in a possible world only suffices for Q to be an accidental property).
Next: one can reject actualism for more than contradictory properties such as being a square circle; my point is not that one should reject the existence of properties that cannot be exemplified, but rather that one should not infer the existence of a property from the fact that it isn't exemplified! (Perhaps the lacking/not having distinction is relevant here, but I don't get its ontological significance - aren't you simply assuming that the former has existential import?).
As for my 1), let me try again. The argument says:
7c. Therefore, if (3), then possibly, P is the only entity that exists.
(7a, 7b)
7d. If any essential property of P is not identical to P, then ~ (7c).
(necessity of identity)
7e. Therefore, If (3), then P is identical to all its essential properties.
(7c, 7d)
Now, you allowed that 7c should really read
7c* Therefore, if (3), then possibly, there are no created entities 'outside' of P.
But the negation of 7c* follows from 7d iff an essential property of P which is not identical to P is something 'outside' P and created by P. So the argument IS assuming that God creates his/her own essential properties.
As for the original 7c, if one thinks that being divine is distinct from God, s/he will certainly reject it, saying that if God doesn't create, God is not the only existing thing: s/he exists, but also his/her essential properties do.
E23: thanks for that. Some quick comments:
ReplyDelete1. I do agree that one may reject actualism--but I take it that many would find that move to be a heft cost.
2. If one denies that P is essentially a person, is one prepared to also deny that there is any property that P has (or lacks) essentially? If not, then one may run the argument using one of those properties instead.
:)
3. I see no premise of E26 that entails that P, though simple, is distinct from its essential properties (thus, that P creates its essential properties if P creates everything "outside" itself). Perhaps your thought is just that someone could say that P is simple and divine yet distinct from its essential properties. I think that's an option, but it's in tension with the doctrine of divine simplicity that Alex is interested in defending (else: why propose that God = divinity if we can say that God has distinct properties that he isn't identical with?)
Entry E14 is interesting to me, but it can be strengthened by replacing 'being abstract' with 'being a property':
ReplyDelete1. God is identical with any property that God has (given simplicity).
2. Thus, God is identical with the property of being Divine.
3. the property of being divine has the property of being a property (all properties have this property given realism).
4. Thus, God has the property of being a property (2,3, Leibniz's Law).
5. Thus, God is identical with the property of being a property (1).
6. Greenness has the property of being a property (premise).
7. Thus, Greenness has the property of being Divine (2,5,6)*
8. But Greenness is not divine.
9. Contradiction!
A rejoinder is to deny (3). It might be said that God = divinity, but that divinity doesn't have the property of being a property. Divinity is a property by virtue of being exemplified by something (namely itself), but not by virtue of having the property of being a property.
Of course, if divinity doesn't have the property of being a property, it might be thought that it lacks that property--in which case we could run the second half of E26.
Author of E14 and E18 here.
ReplyDeleteFirst, I agree with the March 3rd anonymous that my argument in E14 would be stronger if we replaced "being abstract" with "being a property".
Second, here's an argument which attempts to show that no property is simple. Thus, if God is simple, God cannot be a property. This argument presupposes an abundant view of platonic properties.
1. Suppose that there is a property that is simple, call it G (for reductio).
2. G is identical with any property that G instantiates (given simplicity).
3. G instantiates the property of being-identical-with-G. (premise).
4. G instantiates the property of having-at-least-one-property, call the property of instantiating-at-least-one-property O (premise).
5. So the property G is identical with the property of having-at-least-one-property (G=O)(2, 4).
6. For anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.
7. So, for anything that exists, it has the property G (5,6).
8. G is identical with the property of being-identical-with-G (2,3).
9. So, for anything that exists, it has the property of being-identical-with-G (7,8).
10. So, anything that exists is identical with G (9).
11. So G is the only thing that exists.
12. But 11 is false, since you and I exist, and we aren't the property G.
13. Contradiction!
14. So our assumption is false: it is not the case that there is a property that is simple.
a quick proof of 6:
6a. For anything that exists, it is either abstract or concrete.
6b. Any abstract thing instantiates abstractness, and so instantiates at least one property.
6c. Any concrete thing instantiates concreteness, and so instantiates at least one property.
6d. Thus, for anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.
Nothing can be both simple and a property. And so nothing can be simple, a property, and a person. And so God cannot be a property.
Any word on the winners?
ReplyDeleteWinners will be selected this week.
ReplyDeleteEntry E27 (Mon Mar 1 09:38:27 2010):
I realize it's past the deadline, but this isn't actually a new argument. Rather, it's a more elegant (simpler) way of stating E26. I want to make sure that the power of E26 is fully appreciated. :)
Suppose there is a necessarily existing person, P, such that P = divinity and P is simple.
1. I have a property Q (e.g., being a person), such that either it is necessary that P has Q or it is necessary that P lacks Q. (premise)
2. If it is necessary that P has Q, then P = Q. (by divine simplicity)
3. Therefore, if it is necessary that P has Q, then I am divine [have divinity]. (1, 2)
4. I am not divine. (premise)
5. Therefore, it is necessary that P lacks Q. (1, 3, 4)
6. If it is necessary that P lacks Q, then it is necessary that Q exists. (premise)
6a. Necessarily, if P lacks Q, then Q is lacked by P. (premise)
6b. Necessarily, if Q is lacked by P, then Q exists. (serious actualism)
6c. Therefore, if necessarily, P lacks Q, then necessarily, Q exists.
(6a, 6b, distribution axiom)
7. If it is necessary that Q exists, then P = Q. (premise: because P, as simple creator, can exist alone)
8. Therefore, if it is necessary that P lacks Q, then I am divine. (1, 6, 7)
9. Therefore, it is not necessary that P lacks Q, which contradicts (5). (4, 8)
Note: "I" may stand for anything that isn't divine.
Entry E28 (Fri Mar 5 08:05:32 2010):
ReplyDeleteAuthor of E14 and E18 here.
First, I agree with the March 3rd anonymous that my argument in E14 would be stronger if we replaced "being abstract" with "being a property".
Second, here's an argument which attempts to show that no property is simple. If God is simple, then, God cannot be a property. This argument presupposes an abundant view of platonic properties.
1. Suppose that there is a property that is simple, call it G (for reductio).
2. G is identical with any property that G instantiates (given simplicity).
3. G instantiates the property of being-identical-with-G. (assume).
4. G instantiates the property of having-at-least-one-property, call the property of instantiating-at-least-one-property O (assume).
5. So the property G is identical with the property of having-at-least-one-property (G=O)(2, 4).
6. For anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.
7. So, for anything that exists, it has the property G (5,6).
8. G is identical with the property of being-identical-with-G (2,3).
9. So, for anything that exists, it has the property of being-identical-with-G (7,8).
10. So, anything that exists is identical with G (9).
11. So G is the only thing that exists.
12. But 11 is false, since you and I exist, and we aren't the property G.
13. Contradiction!
14. So our assumption is false: it is not the case that there is a property that is simple.
a quick proof of 6
6a. For anything that exists, it is either abstract or concrete.
6b. Any abstract thing instantiates abstractness, and so instantiates at least one property.
6c. Any concrete thing instantiates concreteness, and so instantiates at least one property.
6d. Thus, for anything that exists, it has the property of having-at-least-one-property.
Nothing can be both simple and a property. And so nothing can be simple, a property, and a person. And so God cannot be a property.
E28, you've reminded me that one reason to think that if X is simple that X is identical to its properties is based upon a constituent ontology according to which an entity's properties are parts or constituents of itself. Thus, if something is simple (has no parts or constituents), it has no properties distinct from itself. But someone might think that a constituent ontology holds only for substances and not for properties in general. So, if a person--a substance---is a property, then THAT thing is identical to its properties. Not so for properties that are not persons.
ReplyDeleteI think it's best to reject consituent ontology for both substances and properties. But then what motivation is there to think a simple God is a property at all?
So, IF God is a property, I do think it is reasonable to suppose that God is identical to all God's properties (at least to all his essential ones).
E28 here. March 17th, 2010 11:17am, thanks for the comment. You say:
ReplyDelete"So, if a person--a substance---is a property, then THAT thing is identical to its properties. Not so for properties that are not persons."
Consider: G is the thing that is simple, a person, and a property. G has the properties: being-Identical-with-G (call it 'I') and being-a-Property (call it 'P'). So, by simplicity, G is identical with I and also identical with P (G=I=P). And so anything that instantiates P--that is, anything that is a property--is going to instantiate I. So all properties are identical with G. I grant that if there is a property that is simple and a person, then, as you say, that thing is identical to its properties. And I grant that, as you say, for any property that is not a person, it is not identical to its properties. But I only grant the latter because the antecedent is vacuous. If there is a simple property, then it is the only property.
You also say: "So, IF God is a property, I do think it is reasonable to suppose that God is identical to all God's properties (at least to all his essential ones)."
I agree with this, and would use it as part of a modus tollens (maybe you would, too). I deny the consequent: It isn't reasonable to suppose that God is identical to all God's (essential) properties. Here's why: Suppose that God is identical to all his (essential) properties. If God is identical to all his (essential) properties, then he is identical to the properties: being-Identical-with-G (call it 'I') and bearing-at-least-One-property (call it 'O'). So I=O. So anything that bears at least one property will be identical to God. Everything bears at least one property. And so everything is identical to God. But it is false that everything is identical to God [I have an inflated ego, but not that inflated!] So our starting assumption was false. And thus, it is false that God is identical to all his (essential) properties. Since it has been shown false, it would be unreasonable for us to suppose it. And so, by modus tollens, God is not a property.
Thanks again for the comment.
E26, good point about G=I=P. Perhaps someone can dig their heals and say that God is a property but that God does not have (or even lack, per E27) the property of being a property. That's the only way out I see.
ReplyDeleteSo....who won the contest? =)
ReplyDeleteStill no word? Weren't the winners supposed to be chosen last week? Why the delay?
ReplyDeleteShall we consider it official that it was all a trick to obtain free support for some work in progress? ;)
ReplyDeleteThe winner of the best argument is E5 by Clayton Littlejohn. Congratulations, Clayton!
ReplyDeleteThe winner of the random draw is Matteo Morganti. Congratulations, Matteo!
I am emailing the winners to confirm their email address prior to sending them their prizes.
By the way, let me apologize for the delay with the judging. March was a very busy month.
ReplyDeleteIn case anybody is curious, here are the names of the entrants who did not wish to withhold their names:
E1: Andrew M. Bailey
E2: Andrew Jaeger
E3: Andrew Jaeger
E4: Lewis Powell
E5: Clayton Littlejohn
E6: Chris Tweedt
E8: Clayton Littlejohn
E9: James Bejon
E10: James Bejon
E11: Jonathan D. Jacobs
E14: Tim Pawl
E15: Christian Lee
E16: GJE Rutten
E17: Ian Hegger
E18: Tim Pawl
E19: Andrew Jaeger
E20: Heath White
E21: Brandon N. Towl
E22: Heath White
E23: Matteo Morganti
E24: Raymond W. Aldred
E25: James Chastek
E26: Joshua Rasmussen
E27: Josh Rasmussen
E28: Tim Pawl
Cool: I would like to record my opinion that I think that E5 was indeed the correct choice. Congrats. :)
ReplyDeleteBy the way, I found very interesting some of the arguments that claimed that the conjunction of God is a property and God is simple are incoherent.
ReplyDeleteI didn't select one of them as the winner, as they all depended on the assumption that if any person is a property, it is a simple God, and that assumption was not adequately justified.
This may provide an argument against the conjunction of realism about properties and divine simplicity. One way out of that would be to say that "x is (say) a person" has a different truthmaker in the case of creatures and in the case of God--in our case, the truthmaker is our instantiating personhood, while in the case of God it's his instantiating divine personhood. I do not know whether realism can handle this, but maybe it can. After all, sparse realism already agrees that "x is an F" is not always to be understood by way of instantiation of Fness, because there may be no such thing as Fness, so it may be just a small step from that to say that "x is an F" is understood as affirming an instantiation of F1ness, while "y is an F" is understood as affirming an instantiation of F2ness.
But my purposes aren't to defend the conjunction of simplicity and realism, but only the conjunction of the weaker thesis that God=divinity with realism. And that survives these arguments.
Clayton's E5 (and E8) argument is powerful, but I don't have as strong a notion of ontological categories as he does. I am happy with the possibility of ontic categories that criss-cross (e.g., some persons are angels, and some are animals, while some animals aren't persons (though as far as I know, all angels are persons)).