New Open-Access Journal!

Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy

http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ergo

Ergo is a general, open access philosophy journal accepting submissions on
all philosophical topics and from all philosophical traditions. This
includes, among other things: history of philosophy, work in both the
analytic and continental traditions, as well as formal and empirically
informed philosophy.

Ergo uses a triple-anonymous peer review process and aims to return
decisions within two months on average.

Ergo is published by MPublishing at the University of Michigan and
sponsord by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto.
Papers are published as they are accepted; there is no regular publication
schedule.

To submit a paper, please register and login to Ergo's editorial
management system at:
http://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ergo/index

Submitted manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review, containing
no identifying information. Submissions need not conform to the journal
style unless and until accepted for publication.

Submission and publication is free, but the journal essentially depends on
the support of reliable reviewers returning informative reports in a timely
manner. We hope that you will consider acting as referee for Ergo if asked
by one of its editors. We also hope that you will consider submitting your
work to Ergo.

Please share this call for papers with your colleagues!

Managing Editors
Franz Huber (University of Toronto)
Jonathan Weisberg (University of Toronto)
ergo.editors@gmail.com

Section Editors
Rachael Briggs (Australian National University & Griffith University)
Eleonora Cresto (University of Buenos Aires)
Vincenzo Crupi (University of Turin)
Imogen Dickie (University of Toronto)
Catarina Dutilh-Novaes (University of Groningen)
Kenny Easwaran (University of Southern California)
Matt Evans (University of Michigan)
Laura Franklin-Hall (New York University)
Ole Hjortland (LMU Munich)
Michelle Kosch (Cornell University)
Antonia LoLordo (University of Virginia)
Christy Mag Uidhir (University of Houston)
Julia Markovits (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Lionel McPherson (Tufts University)
Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)
Jill North (Cornell University)
Brian O'Connor (University College Dublin)
Laurie A. Paul (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Richard Pettigrew (Bristol University)
Martin Pickavé (University of Toronto)
Adam Sennet (University of California at Davis)
Nishi Shah (Amherst College)
Quayshawn Spencer (University of San Francisco)
Ásta Sveinsdóttir (San Francisco State University)
Robbie Williams (University of Leeds)
Wayne Wu (Carnegie Mellon University)
Jiji Zhang (Lingnan University)

CFP: The Nature of Propositions and Their Grasp or Understanding (CJP)

This might be of interest to some readers:

The <http://www.canadianjournalofphilosophy.com/> Canadian Journal of Philosophy<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcjp20#.UbHrmitxu8E> announces a second call for papers for a Special Issue co-edited by Gurpreet Rattan and David Hunter.
Propositions are of significant interest for the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. Propositions are thought to play various roles, including that of the meanings of sentences, the referents of 'that'-clauses, the primary bearers of truth, the objects of mental attitudes, and the objects of modal evaluation. The proposed volume focuses on two questions about propositions. One concerns their nature or metaphysics and the other their epistemology. More elaborately, the volume considers questions like:Do propositions represent the world? If so, how does that constrain their nature? If not, how do propositions play the roles that they do? Are propositions objects? Or are they entities of a different sort? Do propositions have truth conditions?  If so, are a proposition’s truth conditions essential to it? What determines a proposition's truth conditions? Are propositions simply to be identified with truth conditions? What does that mean? How should we think of propositions if truth is relative in some way? Are propositions contingent objects, or do they all exist in all possible worlds?Is grasp of or understanding of a proposition an epistemic relation to a proposition? If so, is it a form of acquaintance? If not acquaintance, what kind of epistemic relation is it? And if it is not an epistemic relation, what kind of relation is it? Are there in-principle limits to understanding? Are there propositions that cannot in-principle be grasped or understood? How is thinking about a proposition related to grasping or understanding the proposition? What cognitive capacities are required to think about propositions?Answers to these questions are important for understanding philosophical puzzles about representation, understanding, truth, necessity, reference to abstract objects, and the possibility of agreement and disagreement. This volume aims to bring together original papers that discuss these questions.Submissions should not exceed 10,000 words and should be prepared for blind review. Please include a brief abstract. These should be sent by August 1, 2013 to David Hunter at david.hunter@ryerson.ca<mailto:david.hunter@ryerson.ca>