As an example of the low-ontologist side in the constitution case, Bennett considers the Lewisian position that (let me over simplify here) even, if Statue and the Lump are identical, we can truly say that Statue would not survive being squashed into a ball while Lump would not by appealing to the different counterpart relations in which Lump/Statue stands with otherworldly things.
Bennett complains:
The heart of this strategy is to say that the relatively straightforward predicate 'being possibly squashed' in fact hides a multiplicity of more complex predicates that pack in some reference to the kind. (Lewis, of course, will invoke counterpart-theoretical properties like having a squashed counterpart under the lump-counterpart relation) Perhaps this require that the one-thinger [i.e. the one who takes the low-ontologist side in the constitution dispute] postulate a different complicated modal property for each object the multi-thinger [i.e. the one who takes the high-ontology side in the constitution dispute] countenances. Perhaps it just requires that she employ a different complicated modal predicate for each such object. That depends on the broader question about the viability of nominalism. What matters for my purposes is that the multi-thinger need not do either. (p.28)In other words, what the low-ontologists saves on the cost of her ontology comes at the price of her ideology. Now, I have no sympathy for Lewis' modal realism or his counterpart theory, but Bennett's interpretation of the Lewisian position does not seem to be particularly charitable to me. Let me put aside the issue of nominalism and that of conceptual vs. ontological simplicity and focus on Bennett's interpretation of the Lewisian use of the counterpart relation in this case.
As far as I can see, the Lewisian's reply to Bennett should be that he does not need the complex predicates or the corresponding properties. When saying that 'Lump would survive being squashed' is true and 'Statue would survive being squashed' is not even if 'Lump' and 'Statue' refer to one and only one thing, the Lewisian would not directly appeal to the fact that the same thing has two different modal properties but to the fact that in different contexts the same thing can have different counterparts because the different contexts make different respects of similarirty with otherworldly things relevant. So, for example, when talking of Lump/Statue as 'Lump', we are making the material is made of, its mass, etc. salient, while when talking of it as 'Statue', we are making also its shape and history salient. So, there are things that are counteraprts of Lump/Statue qua lump of clay that are not counterparts of it qua statue (things that resemble it in being made of clay and having a certain mass, etc. but not in having a certain shape etc.) and some of this things are temporal parts of things whose other temporal parts were counterparts of Lump/Statue qua statue but are no longer counterparts of it because they no longer bear the right sort of resemblance to Lump/Statue qua statue because they have been squashed. So, the Lewisian really only needs the property having been squashed and claim that some counterparts of Lump/Staute qua lump of clay have it while some counterparts of it qua statue do not have it. It is only in virute of its counterparts having or not having the property having been squashed that Lump/Statue has or has not (derivatively) the modal property of being possibly squashed. Of course, Bennett could claim that the counterpart theory already comes at too high an ideological cost (I would just say that it is false, but I won't argue for that here), but Lewis and the Lewisians would claim it's a cost worth paying because of the benefit that it brings with it and, in any case, the Lewisian does not seem to need the strange predicates Bennett wants to saddle them with. Am I being too charitable to the Lewisian position or unfair to Bennett's objection?
I think I'd put the point slightly differently. Bennett is right that the one-thinger needs a richer repertoire of modal properties than the multi-thinger. But the counterpart theorist has a rich repertoire of modal properties, underwritten by different respects of similarity—so that extra ideological bill is paid in full by counterpart theory. (Or if there are any outstanding charges, they're just those incurred by counterpart theory itself.) And if counterpart theory can be had cheaply, then the one-thinger has nothing left to be embarrassed about. Of course, if the multi-thinger could give a reductive account of her extra ontology, the same would hold.
ReplyDeleteIt sounds like Bennett may be using "property" in a more loaded way than I just did, in which case I may have to pick my words a bit more carefully, but the point still stands. Costs are no big deal, if you can pay them.
Hi Jeff,
ReplyDeleteLet me put my point differently, as I take Bennett's point to be about predicates (ideology) not about properties (ontology).As Bennett clearly says at the beginning of the passage I quoted that her point is about how, on the Lewisian strategy, the predicate 'being possibly squashed'would "[hide] a multiplicity of more complex predicates". My point was that there is no extra ideological bill for the Lewisian to foot. The Lewisian does not need that multiplicity of complex predicates because what he is claiming is not that there are a multiplicity of predicates Lump/Statue satisfies in all contexts, but that there is one predicate--'being possibly squashed'--that Statue/Lump can be said to satisfy in some conversational contexts but not in others because of the different counterpart relations made relevant by those contexts.
In any case, we seem to agree that, contrary to what Bennett seems to be arguing, all this comes at no extra ideological (nor, as you point out, ontological) cost if one accepts the standard (modal realism + counterpart theory) package. Right?
A handful of thoughts here:
ReplyDeleteFirst, I think it makes a big difference whether we have Lewis-the-modal-realist or some other non-modal-realist-like counterpart theorist in mind. For, suppose I start the day with no views on modal realism whatsoever. I start thinking about statues and lumps, and then decide I need something counterpart-theoretic-like to solve my problems. If I decide to go full-blown modal realist just to take care of this, then I've gone high *ontology* in a pretty straightforward sense (although not one in which I've multiplied number of things in the statue-shaped region). But if I do something else, then I may have to go high ideology instead; it's not at all obvious that I can simply help myself to some sort of similarity relation and go all context-dependent on that, since I don't have the needed possibilia to serve as relata for it. So I will need some sort of extra ideology to tell me which ersatz individuals *count* as counterparts (or similar, or whatever). (We'll also lose the ability to analyze modal operators, so we'll need modal ideology to make up for it, too.) In other words: it looks to me that, at this point in the dialectic, the ideology/ontology point just gets *pushed back*, in this case to whether we have a high ontology or high ideology counterpart theory.
Also, I think it's important for Bennett's points that we're not considering an already committed theorist -- say who buys modal realism + counterpart theory -- and ask them if they get any extra commitments by adopting a certain solution to a puzzle. The question is how their commitments, both ideological and ontological, compare to some *other* theorist's who adopts a different response to a question. In this case, it does look as though (say) the non-Lewisian counterpart theorist has a higher ideology than the non-Lewisian two-thinger; the non-Lewisian two-thinger needs just primitive modal operators, but the non-Lewisian one-thinger needs either (1) multiple primitive modal operators corresponding to different counterpart relations, or (2, and more likely) other ideological resources to "define up" something that works like (1).
(Notice that the Lewisian two-thinger and the Lewisian one-thinger are metaphysically equivalent: the Lewisian one-thinger, who rejects counterpart theory, is (presumably) just Lewis with modal overlap, where individuals are identified with transworld sums and coincidence is interpreted as overlap-at-a-world.)
Hi Jason,
ReplyDeleteFirst, I think it makes a big difference whether we have Lewis-the-modal-realist or some other non-modal-realist-like counterpart theorist in mind. For, suppose I start the day with no views on modal realism whatsoever. I start thinking about statues and lumps, and then decide I need something counterpart-theoretic-like to solve my problems. If I decide to go full-blown modal realist just to take care of this, then I've gone high *ontology* in a pretty straightforward sense (although not one in which I've multiplied number of things in the statue-shaped region). But if I do something else, then I may have to go high ideology instead
I'm not sure the ersatz modal realist needs more ideology than the extreme modal realist (and partly because, to me, it is far from clear what 'ideology' covers). In any case, Bennett seems to be talking about Lewis not about some other modal realist and seems to be assuming that he occupies the low ontology side of the dispute (presumably because what she means by 'low ontologists' in this context are just the one-thingers). Moreover, Lewis clearly did not decide to go full-blown modal realist to solve material constitution puzzles. If one were to identify his single most important reason for going modal realist I guess it would be to provide an analyisis of modality and what I think Lewis would have said is that the material constitution puzzles are solved for free once one accepts his (modal realism + counterpart theory + perdurantism) package because they are puzzles about identity through time and/or possible worlds.
it's not at all obvious that I can simply help myself to some sort of similarity relation and go all context-dependent on that, since I don't have the needed possibilia to serve as relata for it. So I will need some sort of extra ideology to tell me which ersatz individuals *count* as counterparts (or similar, or whatever).
To me it's not at all obvious that the ersatzer cannot help herself to some sort of similarity relation and go all context-dependent on that. If she can't, she was already losing to the extreme modal realist on the modality ground and you are right the debate gets pushed back. But Bennett is not considering the debate between two kinds of modal realist but between the Lewis-style one-thinger and her multi-thinger opponent.
Also, I think it's important for Bennett's points that we're not considering an already committed theorist -- say who buys modal realism + counterpart theory -- and ask them if they get any extra commitments by adopting a certain solution to a puzzle. The question is how their commitments, both ideological and ontological, compare to some *other* theorist's who adopts a different response to a question.
I think that metaphysical position are assessed on the basis of their simplicity and explanatory power, so you can't judge the simplicity of a theory without assessing how many other problems it helps you solve, or at least this is what Lewis would have claimed. As far as I can see, no one would go modal realist (whether full-blown or not) just to solve material constitution puzzles. It is only if those who are already modal realists that will try to use their theory to solve them.